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The general equilibrium model has gained its popularity in economics since it was in-
troduced by Arrow-Debreu-Mckenzie in 1950s. This model has been extended in several
directions in the last several decades. For example, Aumann [8] extended the general
equilibrium model to large games with a continuum space of agents. Radner [45] in-
troduced private information in the model to reflect the heterogeneity in information
among agents. Sun and Yannelis (see [53] and [54]) built a private information economy
model in which each agent has negligible information. This thesis will adopt Sun and
Yannelis’ model and analyze various concepts of solutions for the model. It consists of
four chapters.
In Chapter One, we present all preliminaries for the succeeding chapters. It covers a
large deterministic pure exchange economy model, a private information economy model,
a framework for the modeling of uncertainty, and the mathematical background on Fubini
extension product space introduced in Sun [49].
In Chapter Two, we formulate Radner’s rational expectations equilibrium (REE) for
the private information economy model. We show that in the new formulation, rational
expectations equilibrium exists. Furthermore, the resulting price in the equilibrium may
ix
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depend only on the macro state of nature or even degenerate to a constant under certain
conditions.
In Chapter Three, we introduce a new notion of solution called rational expectations
equilibrium with aggregate signals based on Radner’s definition of REE. In a REE with
aggregate signals, agents make inference of information from not only commodity prices
as they do in REE, but also from the aggregate signal distributions announced by a
centralized agent. Two theorems on the existence of equilibrium are proven.
One important topic in general equilibrium analysis is the equivalence between vari-
ous concepts of solution. The last two chapters endeavor this task. In Chapter Four, the
equivalence between Radner equilibrium, private core and insurance equilibrium is estab-
lished. And in the last chapter, we continue to prove the equivalence between bargaining
set, Walrasian equilibrium and core in the ex ante sense.
For the reader’s convenience, we list some notations and mathematical definitions
in Appendix A. The reader may consult that part of the thesis when encountering
unfamiliar notations or mathematical definitions.
Chapter1
Preliminaries
This chapter lays the groundwork for our discussion in the succeeding chapters. It is
organized as follows: in the first section, we introduce a large deterministic pure exchange
economy model that will be frequently used in our treatment of private information
economy; in the second section, we provide a framework to model uncertainty and private
information in an economy; in the third section, we present the main economic model of
this thesis, namely, private information economy model; in the last section, we discuss
Fubini extension and the exact law of large numbers, which plays a crucial role in most
of our proofs.
Although it is not our intention to study large deterministic pure exchange economies,
in this thesis we often resort to an auxiliary large deterministic pure exchange economy
and apply those well established results for this economy in our treatment of private
information economy. For this reason, in the first section, we will introduce a large
deterministic pure exchange economy model and discuss relevant results including the
existence of Walrasian equilibrium, optimality of Walrasian equilibrium, core equivalence
theorem and equivalence theorem of bargaining set.
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The centerpiece of this thesis is private information economy. Contrary to determin-
istic economies, in a private information economy, agents have no complete information.
They may be uncertain about the state of nature, about their own utilities or about
other agents’ status. Each agent acquires the knowledge of truth through a piece of
private information. To facilitate the modeling of uncertainty and private information,
a framework will be provided in the second section. Based on this framework, a private
information economy model is built in the third section.
In this thesis, we require a signal processes to be pairwise independent (or condition-
ally pairwise independent). This poses a measurability problem when the agent space is
continuum. To overcome this issue, we will build our signal process on the Fubini ex-
tension product space introduced in Sun [49]. The exact law of large numbers on Fubini
extension space is a powerful tool for our purpose. The last section of this chapter is
dedicated to these topics.
1.1 Large deterministic pure exchange economy
Aumann’s large deterministic pure exchange economy model has been studied thoroughly
in the literature and all major results such as existence of equilibrium and core equiv-
alence have been established. In order to employ these results, we will from time to
time construct an auxiliary deterministic economy in our analysis of private information
economies. For this reason, we will make a detailed discussion on large deterministic
pure exchange economy and those important results in this section.
1.1.1 An introduction to pure exchange economy
The study of pure exchange economy was initiated by Leon Walras and its modern theory
was established by Kenneth Arrow, Gerard Debreu and Lionel W. McKenzie in the 1950s.
Since then, it has evolved into a full-fledged branch in microeconomics known as general
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equilibrium analysis.
One important feature of the pure exchange economy model is that there is no pro-
duction taking place in the economy. Each agent1 comes to the market with a stock of
commodities. They trade their goods with each other to improve welfare. The insulation
of the trade sector from the rest of an economy (in particular, the production sector)
seems questionable and may cast doubt on the soundness of the model. However, this
idealization should not be too surprising as it is a common tactic in science and social
science to make a problem tractable by simplifying the situation. The significance of
this model should not be understated. To give the reader an idea of what a pure ex-
change economy looks like, we provide the following example.2 Suppose there are two
inhabitants in the island Kava: Ethan and Liam. Ethan grows crops and Liam makes
clothes. If no trade happens between them, Ethan will be frozen in the winter and Liam
will starve to death. The tragedy can be avoided if they agree to meet and trade their
own products. Ethan will then have warm clothes to get through the freezing winter and
Liam will have enough food and no longer suffer starvation. While the story is simple
and fictional, the moral it demonstrates is of importance: trading can make both parties
better.
To make the situation more realistic, this time let us assume that there are more
traders, say thousands upon thousands of them. Each commodity in the market has a
price. A trader can sell her3 own stock of commodities for money and use the money
to buy commodities from other traders to improve her well-being. Economists are often
interested in these questions: what consumption will each trader make in this scenario?
How will the commodities be priced? To answer these questions is not only intellectually
satisfying but also of practical benefit. It enhances our understanding of the mechanism
of market and improves the predictability of people’s economic behavior. The economic
1Other synonyms for agent are trader and market participant.
2[22] and [31] have some interesting examples for pure exchange economies.
3In accordance with the prevailing convention in economics, a trader is referred to be female, but with
no discrimination against any gender.
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model addressing these issues was developed by Arrow, Debreu and McKenzie in two
separate papers [7] and [42], and it is often called the Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie model
in the literature. In their model, an economy consists of a finite number of agents,
characterized by a preference4 and a stock of commodities that they can consume or
trade in the market. Arrow, Debreu and McKenzie showed that with some reasonable
assumptions, commodities in the economy can be so priced that each agent opts for a
commodity bundle that maximizes their welfare within the limit of their income, i.e., the
market value of their own commodities. This notion of prices and optimal consumption is
called competitive equilibrium or Walrasian equilibrium in honor of Walras who was the
first to formulate these issues (see [56]). In this thesis, we will consider models that are
based on Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie model, but incorporate uncertainty in the economy
and possess genuine ”price-taking” property - a key assumption in the Arrow-Debreu-
McKenzie model.
1.1.2 Large deterministic pure exchange economy
This section explains in detail three essential parts of a large deterministic pure exchange
economy: agent space, commodity space and agent’s characteristics.
The Agent Space
One of the essential hypotheses in general equilibrium analysis is that the markets in
question are perfectly competitive. Perfect (or nearly perfect) competition is likely to
exist when there are a large number of agents in the market. In such a market, each
individual plays an insignificant role. Their individual choices and behavior have little
effect on the economy as a whole. It is their collective behavior that matters. When a
4A preference of an agent is a measure of her satisfaction over commodity bundles, i.e., a combination
of different commodities. Roughly speaking, b is preferred to a by agent A if agent A likes b more than
a.
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market is perfectly competitive, no individual can gain an edge over others by maneuver-
ing their personal information, consumptions and other economic resources. Among all
the characteristics a perfectly competitive market possesses, the one relevant to general
equilibrium analysis is the price-taking property, which says that all market participants
take commodity prices as given when trade takes place. However, price-taking only
happens when market participants have neither incentive nor ability to manipulate the
prices. The former is hard to justify and the latter entails a proper model. The finite
agent Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie model is inherently flawed in this regard. No matter how
large the number of agents is, as long as it remains finite, no one is really negligible. To
remedy this, Aumann in his influential paper [8] introduced a new model where there
are as many agents as the number of points in the unit interval [0, 1] of the real line
R. This approach is in line with the philosophy that continuum is an approximation to
finiteness, which has long been a practice in other fields such as physics. It has proven
to be successful for us to follow.
We take the space of agents to be an atomless measure space (I, I, λ). Each agent
is indexed by an element i in I. We assume λ(I) = 1, which makes the agent space
a probability space but incurs no loss of generality. The agent space being atomless is
crucial to guarantee the negligibility of individual agents.
It shall be noted that some authors, following Aumann, use the unit interval [0, 1] with
Lebesgue measure as the space of agent. However, the special algebraic and topological
structure of the unit interval [0, 1] is not necessary for the modeling of negligible agents.
An atomless measure space serves the purpose as well as the unit interval [0, 1] does (See
[30]). The choice of [0, 1] for the space of agent is merely made by most authors for the
convenience of exposition.
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The Commodity Space
There are a finite number m of commodities in the economy. A commodity bundle is a
collection of commodities. It can thus be represented as a vector x in the m-dimensional
Euclidean space Rm. Let the commodity bundle be x = (x1, . . . , xm), then xj is the
quantity of the j-th commodity. We take the commodity space of all commodity
bundles to be Rm.
Agent’s Characteristics
Each agent i ∈ I has the following characteristics:
Consumption Set Each agent i ∈ I is characterized by a consumption set Xi of all
feasible commodity bundles she can have. For simplicity, we assume Xi = Rm+ ,
where Rm+ is the positive cone of Rm. As we can see now, although the commodity
space spans the whole space of Rm, each agent is limited to her own consumption
set Rm+ of nonnegative commodity bundles.
Utility Function A utility function u is a mapping from I × Rm+ to R+. For i ∈ I,
the notation ui is often used to denote the function u(i, ·). For x ∈ Rm+ , ui(x) is
agent i’s utility (i.e., numeric value of satisfaction) with commodity bundle x. For
technical reasons, we assume that u(·, ·) is I × BRm+ -measurable, where BRm+ is the
Borel σ-algebra on Rm+ and I × BRm+ is the product σ-algebra of I and BRm+ .
Initial Endowment The mapping e : I → Rm+ denotes initial endowments. For i ∈ I,
e(i) is the initial endowment of agent i. Initial endowments are the commodities
an agent brings to the market for exchange. We assume that e is λ-integrable.
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Large deterministic pure exchange economy model
There are two basic elements in a large deterministic pure exchange economy model:
agents and commodities. A commodity is, in a broad sense, anything that an economic
agent can consume or trade for her well-being. The set of all commodity bundles make up
the commodity space. Each agent is characterized by a consumption set of all accessible
commodity bundles, a utility function of her numeric value of satisfaction over commodity
bundles, and an exogenously given commodity bundle of initial endowment. The set of
all agents is called the agent space. This model is summarized in the following definition:
Definition 1.1.1. (Large Deterministic Pure Exchange Economy) A large deter-
ministic pure exchange economy E = {(I, I, λ), u, e} consists of
1. an atomless measure space of agent (I, I, λ),
2. a commodity space Rm,
3. for each agent i ∈ I,
• a consumption set Xi,
• a utility function ui,
• an initial endowment e(i).
It is often called a large deterministic economy for short.
1.1.3 Competitive equilibrium, core, bargaining set and efficiency
Once the model has been established, it is natural to seek for the solutions to this
model. Several notions of solution for the large deterministic pure exchange economy
model have been proposed in the literature, each from a different perspective and with
different approach. In this thesis, we only introduce those notions that are relevant to
us. More specifically, we will introduce competitive equilibrium, core and bargaining set.
In addition, we will also discuss the efficiency of these solutions.
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Competitive equilibrium (or Walrasian equilibrium)
In a market, the value of a commodity is reflected in its price. Let the price of the j-th
commodity be pj . The collection of all commodity prices is called a price of commodities
and is represented by the vector p = (p1, . . . , pm) in Rm+ . In this thesis, the letter p is
reserved exclusively for price. Since the magnitude of prices is of no significance in
our analysis and what matters to us is the relative prices, we restrict our attention to
normalized price p ∈ ∆m, where ∆m is the unix simplex of Rm+ . There are other options
for price normalization, an interested reader can refer to the Chapter 6 of [22].
Even though an agent has a consumption set of Rm+ , circumstances often prevent
them from accessing every commodity bundle in their consumption set. For instance, a
household cannot exceed its expenditure to the income without borrowing; and a self-
financing investor can invest no more than the value of his or her current portfolio.
In our model, an agent has no other means to earn income except to sell her initial
resources. When the commodity price is p, an agent with initial endowment e has a
total income of pe, where pe is understood to be the usual inner product in Euclidean
space. As borrowing is prohibited, each agent can only purchase a commodity bundle
c whose value does not exceed her income, i.e., pc ≤ pe. We call the set of all such
commodity bundles a budget set of agent i at the price p, denoted by Bi(p). Hence,
Bi(p) = {z ∈ Rm+ : pz ≤ pe(i)}.
In the competitive equilibrium model, each agent will choose a commodity bundle
to maximize her utility. For each i ∈ I, let xi be agent i’s choice. The collective choice
is the set {xi : i ∈ I}. It can be viewed as a mapping x from I to Rm+ , where x(i)
(also written as xi) is agent i’s choice of commodity bundle. Such an x is called an
allocation. A clairvoyant reader may not agree with the use of term ”allocation” for
”choices” since the former usually implies a centralized agent. However, in this thesis we
do not differentiate them. The following gives a formal definition of allocation and the
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concept of feasibility of an allocation.
Definition 1.1.2. 1. An allocation x for the large deterministic pure exchange econ-
omy E = {(I, I, λ), u, e} is an integrable mapping from I to Rm+ . For i ∈ I, x(i) is
the commodity bundle of agent i.





Remark 1.1.3. The above definition of feasibility implies two things:
1. there is no free disposal; and
2. the aggregate consumption shall not exceed the aggregate initial endowments.
Given these preparation, we can now define the notion of competitive equilibrium (or
Walrasian equilibrium) for the large deterministic pure exchange economic E .
Definition 1.1.4. (Competitive Equilibrium or Walrasian Equilibrium) A com-
petitive equilibrium (or Walrasian equilibrium) for the large deterministic pure exchange
economic E = {(I, I, λ), u, e} is a pair of an allocation x∗ and a price p∗ such that





2. for λ-almost all i ∈ I, x∗i is a maximizer of the following problem
max ui(z)
s.t. z ∈ Bi(p∗)
Condition (1) is the standard feasibility, i.e., market clearing.
Condition (2) indicates that agents maximize their utility subject to their budget
constraint.
The following definition follows naturally from the above definition:
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Definition 1.1.5. (Competitive Equilibrium Allocation or Walrasian Alloca-
tion) In the large deterministic pure exchange economy E, an allocation x is called a
competitive equilibrium allocation (or Walrasian allocation) if there exists a price p such
that x and p form a Walrasian equilibrium. The set of all competitive equilibrium allo-
cations is denoted by WE(E).
Given the model of large deterministic pure exchange economy and the definition of
Walrasian equilibrium, the first question one can expect to be asked may be: does there
always exist a Walrasian equilibrium for a large deterministic pure exchange economy?
The answer is affirmative. The next theorem, proven by Aumann in [9], shows that there
exists a Walrasian equilibrium for the large deterministic pure exchange economy if some
additional conditions are imposed.
Theorem 1.1.6. Let E = {(I, I, λ), u, e} be a large deterministic pure exchange econ-




2. for each i ∈ I, ui is continuous and strictly monotone 5,
then there exists a Walrasian equilibrium.
This theorem says that Walrasian equilibria exist in an economy where every com-
modity has a positive supply and the utility function of each agent is well-behaved
(continuous and strictly monotone).
There are two things about this theorem that call upon special attention: 1) Au-
mann’s theorem in [9] was stated for preference rather than utility function. However,
these two concepts are equivalent under some quite general conditions. A detailed treat-
ment of this topic is given in Chapter 4 of [15]; and 2) the agent space in Aumann’s
5See Definition A.0.3 of Appendix A
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paper is the unit interval [0, 1] of the real line. We use a more general agent space, but
the theorem remains valid (see [30]).
Core
The essential issue in a pure exchange economy model is how to redistribute initial re-
sources in a reasonable (and hopefully efficient) way. Resources are redistributed through
the market in a competitive equilibrium model: each commodity has a price and agents
purchase commodity bundles within their income to maximize utility. The concept of
core is different in that it focuses entirely on the result of resource redistribution. The
way how resources are redistributed is irrelevant. It aims to accomplish a fair allocation
(in the sense that will become clear to the reader soon) of initial endowments.
One distinct feature in the notion of core is the existence of cooperation among agents.
They can join freely with each other to form a group and collaborate to become better
off. This kind of group is formally called a coalition and its definition is given below:
Definition 1.1.7. (Coalition) A coalition is a set A ∈ I of positive measure, i.e.,
λ(A) > 0.
Before we introduce core, we need the following definition:
Definition 1.1.8. Let x and y be allocations in the large deterministic pure exchange






2. ui(xi) > ui(yi) for λ-almost all i ∈ S.
When agents have the freedom to form coalitions, they will not accept an allocation
which can be blocked by another allocation. For example, in the above definition, agents
in S will not be content with allocation y. If they take the allocation yi, their utility
is ui(yi). On the other hand, they can form a coalition S and redistribute their initial
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endowments to get xi. The redistribution among agents in S is possible because of
Condition (1). The latter yields a higher utility for agents in the coalition S according
to Condition (2).
It becomes clear that in an economy with free formation of coalition, an allocation
that can be blocked cannot serve as a good solution to the model. This leads to the
following definition of core allocation and core:
Definition 1.1.9. (Core and Core allocation) Let E = {(I, I, λ), u, e} be a large
deterministic pure exchange economy.
1. A feasible allocation x is called a core allocation if there is no allocation that blocks
x.
2. The core of E is the set of all core allocations. It is denoted by C(E).
By now, we have discussed two concepts of solution for the large deterministic pure
exchange economy E . The following theorem shows that these two concepts coincide
under some general assumptions.
Theorem 1.1.10. (Core Equivalence Theorem) Let E = {(I, I, λ), u, e} be a large




2. for each i ∈ I, ui is continuous and strictly monotone,
then WE(E) = C(E).
This theorem is due to Aumann [8]. The reader can refer to [8], [39], [31] or [22] for a
proof. It says that in an economy where every commodity has a positive supply and the
utility function of each agent is well-behaved (continuous and strictly monotone), core
allocations and Walrasian allocations are identical. Any Walrasian allocation is a core
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allocation. Conversely, for a core allocation, we can find a price to support a Walrasian
allocation. The economic implication of this theorem is that in a large economy, a core
allocation can be achieved through the market despite the fact that its definition is free
of the market mechanism. This result is remarkable as it is well known that this theorem
does not hold in an economy with finite agents.
Bargaining set
The notion of core can be refined in various ways. Aumann and Maschler’s bargaining
set (see [10]) is one of the attempts on this track. Given an allocation, a group of agents
can threat to break the contracts by forming a coalition on their own. The threat is
considered to be valid in the notion of core if it results in a higher utility for each agent
in the coalition . A core allocation is an allocation where no valid threat (in the above-
mentioned sense) exists. However, as pointed out in [10] and [40], this type of threat may
not be defendable if the reaction of other agents to such a threat is taken into account.
This motivates the notion of bargaining set.
Definition 1.1.11. (Objection) Let E = {(I, I, λ), u, e} be a large deterministic pure
exchange economy. Suppose x is an allocation, (S, y) is a pair of a coalition and an






2. • ui(yi) ≥ ui(xi) for λ-almost all i ∈ S and
• λ ({i ∈ S : ui(yi) > ui(xi)}) > 0.
Remark 1.1.12. 1. When the utility function ui of agent i is continuous and strictly
monotone, Condition (2) is equivalent to
(2’) ui(yi) > ui(xi) for λ-almost all i ∈ S.
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2. Note that (S, y) is an objection to x if and only if y blocks x on S (see Definition
1.1.8). The term ”objection” is for bargaining set and ”block” is used in the context
of core.
Definition 1.1.13. (Counterobjection) Let E = {(I, I, λ), u, e} be a large determin-
istic pure exchange economy. Suppose x is an allocation, (S, y) is an objection to the







2. • ui(zi) > ui(yi) for λ-almost all i ∈ T ∩ S,
• ui(zi) > ui(xi) for λ-almost all i ∈ T \ S.
It is evident that an objection is futile if there is a counterobjection to it. As in
the definition, if agents in the coalition threat to break the contracts, some of them
(agents in T ∩ S) can join other agents in T \ S to form a new coalition T and realize a
higher utility than what they would otherwise get in the coalition S. In other words, an
objection is credible if there is no counterobjection to it. Such an objection is then said
to be justified.
Definition 1.1.14. An objection is said to be justified if there is no counterobjection to
it.
The notion of bargaining set takes into consideration the effect of counterobjection.
An objection is valid only if it is justified. The bargaining set is the set of all allocations
that have no justified allocation. The formal definition is given below:
Definition 1.1.15. (Bargaining Set) Let E = {(I, I, λ), u, e} be a large deterministic
pure exchange economy.
1. A allocation is called a bargaining allocation if it is feasible and has no justified
objection.
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2. The bargaining set of E is the set of all bargaining allocations. It is denoted by
B(E).
In contrast to core, the notion of bargaining set excludes the possibility of being
blocked by an unjustified objection. Hence, it becomes harder to block an allocation
in the context of bargaining set. This means the bargaining set is usually bigger than
core. In general, we have WE(E) ⊂ C(E) ⊂ B(E). It is interesting to know when these
three concepts coincide. Mas-Colell [40] investigated this issue and proved the following
theorem:
Theorem 1.1.16. Let E = {(I, I, λ), u, e} be a large deterministic pure exchange econ-




2. for each i ∈ I, ui is continuous and strictly monotone,
then WE(E) = B(E).
This theorem says that the concepts of Walrasian equilibrium and bargaining set
coincide in an economy where every commodity has a positive supply and the utility
function of each agent is well-behaved (continuous and strictly monotone). In combina-
tion with the fact WE(E) ⊂ C(E) ⊂ B(E), these three concepts are identical under these
assumptions. Hence, we have the following corollary:
Corollary 1.1.17. Let E = {(I, I, λ), u, e} be a large deterministic pure exchange econ-




2. for each i ∈ I, ui is continuous and strictly monotone,
then WE(E) = C(E) = B(E).
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Efficiency
One main concern in economics is the efficiency of resource redistribution. There are
various ways of defining efficiency. In general equilibrium analysis, one usually consid-
ers Pareto efficiency (or Pareto optimality). Roughly speaking, an allocation is Pareto
efficient if there is no way to improve the welfare of agents without making anybody
worse off. There are two versions of Pareto efficiency, namely, weak efficiency and strong
efficiency. We give the definitions below.
Definition 1.1.18. (Weakly Pareto Efficient) Let E = {(I, I, λ), u, e} be a large
deterministic pure exchange economy, x be a feasible allocation for E. x is said to be
weakly efficient (or weakly Pareto optimal) if there is no feasible allocation y such that
ui(yi) > ui(xi)
for λ-almost all i ∈ I.
Hence, an allocation is weakly Pareto efficient if there is no allocation that can make
every agent better off.
Definition 1.1.19. (Strongly Pareto Efficient) Let E = {(I, I, λ), u, e} be a large
deterministic pure exchange economy, x be a feasible allocation for E. x is said to be
strongly efficient (or strongly Pareto optimal) if there is no feasible allocation y such that
1. ui(yi) ≥ ui(xi) for λ-almost all i ∈ I,
2. λ ({i ∈ I : ui(yi) > ui(xi)}) > 0.
Hence, an allocation is strongly Pareto efficient if there is no allocation which can
make some of them better off without impairing others’ benefit.
Remark 1.1.20. 1. Clearly, weak efficiency implies strong efficiency.
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2. Two definitions of efficiency coincide when agents’ utility is continuous and strictly
monotone. Intuitively, we may take away a little amount of commodities from those
agents for whom the strict inequality holds in the definition and redistribute these
commodities to those agents with ui(yi) = ui(xi), i.e., agents in Condition (2). All
agents are better off in the new allocation.
3. The term efficiency (or efficient) usually refers to strong efficiency (or strongly
efficient) unless explicitly stated.
It is not difficult to see that a core allocation is efficient. The following theorem shows
that a Walrasian allocation is also efficient.
Theorem 1.1.21. (First Welfare Theorem) Let E = {(I, I, λ), u, e} be a large de-
terministic pure exchange economy. If x is a Walrasian allocation, then x is efficient.
The converse, i.e., an efficient allocation is a Walrasian allocation, is also true under
some assumptions. It is called the Second Welfare Theorem. We shall not discuss it since
it is beyond the scope of this thesis.
In combination with Corollary 1.1.17, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1.1.22. Let E = {(I, I, λ), u, e} be a large deterministic pure exchange econ-




2. for each i ∈ I, ui is continuous and strictly monotone,
then a Walrasian allocation, a core allocation or a bargaining allocation is efficient.
1.2 Modeling of uncertainty and private information
While the deterministic pure exchange economy model captures the basic features of the
trade sector of a market, there are still two important elements missing in the model:
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uncertainty and information. We all go about our lives under uncertainty. This is no
exception for market participants. Their consumptions, production plans and trade are
all made under uncertainty. However, these decisions are not made entirely blindfolded.
Agents rely on available information in their decision making. Information is asymmetric
to agents. For example, an insider trader usually knows the market better than an
outsider does. To reflect these two facts, Sun and Yannelis (see for example [49], [52],
[54]) introduced a private information economy model in which agents have no direct
knowledge of the real state of nature (i.e., uncertainty); they instead receive a noisy
private information signal (i.e., asymmetric information). This section covers their model
of uncertainty and private information.
1.2.1 Macro state of nature and private information
For simplicity, we assume that an economy can only be in one of a finite number of
states called macro states of nature. S = {s1, s2, . . . , sK} is the set of all possible
macro states of nature. Agents acquire their knowledge of the real macro state of nature
through available information. Though oftentimes they find themselves overwhelmed by
a sea of information, having more information does not promise them a deeper insight into
the world. Information sometimes, at best, reflects partial truth and, at worst, distorts
the reality. A rally in a company’s stock price would possibly leave its shareholders an
impression of profitability and make them unaware of its operational inefficiency. In
short, information is noisy and it is difficult for market participants to fathom the exact
happenings of a market. For this reason, we do not presume agents know the real macro
state of nature. Instead, they are informed of a signal conveying limited information
on the realization of macro state of nature. This piece of information is called private
information signal. Signals are drawn randomly by Mother Nature from a finite set
T 0 = {q1, q2, . . . , qL}. Although all agents share the same types of signals, we do not
preclude the possibility of an agent receiving a certain signal with probability zero.
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We call the collective signals t of all agents a signal profile. Alternatively, t can be
viewed as a mapping from I to T 0. For each i ∈ I, t(i) is agent i’s private information
signal. t(i) is often written as ti
6 wherever no confusion will arise. t is assumed to be
measurable for technical reasons.
All signal profiles form the space of signal profiles T . Mother Nature picks ran-
domly a signal profile t from T and informs each agent of their private information signal.
To facilitate the modeling of randomness (or uncertainty from an agent’s perspective),
we associate T with a σ-algebra T .
A signal process f is a IT -measurable mapping from I×T to T 0. In our models,
we work with the signal process f(i, t) = ti.
1.2.2 Uncertainty
There are two sources for uncertainty: macro state of nature and signal profiles. We
assume that all agents have a common belief P of the probability distribution concerning
macro state of nature and signal profiles. Let (Ω,F) be the product space of (S,S) and
(T, T ), where S is the power set of S, Ω = S × T and F = S ⊗ T . Then, uncertainty
can be modeled by the probability measure space (Ω,F , P ).
Let PS and P T be the marginal probability measures of P respectively on (S,S) and
on (T, T ). For any A ∈ S, PS(A) = P (A×T ) is the probability that the event A occurs.
Similarly, for any B ∈ T , P T (B) = P (S×B) is the probability that the event B happens.
In particular, for each s ∈ S, PS({s}) is the probability that the macro state of nature
is s. For notational convenience, we let pis = P
S({s}). Each macro state of nature s ∈ S
is required be essential in the sense that pis > 0. This prerequisite does no harm as we
only discard the macro states of nature that will never happen probabilistically.
Let s˜ and t˜i, i ∈ I be the projection mappings from Ω to S and from Ω to T 0
6It is a notational convention in the literature that tA refers to the restriction of a function t to the
subset A of its domain and t−A = tAc . When A = {i} is a singleton, it will further be shortened to ti
and t−i.
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respectively, i.e., s˜(s, t) = s and t˜i(s, t) = ti
7.
Let P Ts be the conditional probability measure on (T, T ) when the random variable
s˜ takes value s. For each B ∈ T , P Ts (B) = P ({s} × B)/pis is the probability that the





When an economy is in the state s ∈ S, the probability distribution of agent i’s
private information signals conditioned on macro state of nature is P Ts f
−1
i
8. For q ∈ T 0,
agent i has a probability P Ts (f
−1
i (q))
9 to receive the private information signal q if the
macro state of nature is s.







for q ∈ T 0.
The following lemma shows that µs is a probability measure on T
0.
Lemma 1.2.1. Let µs be as defined in Equation (1.1). Then it is well-defined, a proba-










I×T 1{q}(f(i, t))dλ× P Ts .
for each q ∈ T 0, where 1{q} is the indicator function of the singleton {q}.









1{q}(f(i, t))dλ× P Ts ≤
∫
I×T
1dλ× P Ts = 1,
7t˜i can also be viewed as a projection from T to T
0.
8Fix i ∈ I, fi is defined to be a mapping from T to T 0 such that fi(t) = f(i, t). We adopt this
convention without explicit mention in the sequel.
9f−1i (q) = f
−1
i ({q}), the curly braces are often omitted for the conciseness of notation.
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1{q}(f(i, t)) is λ× P Ts -integrable.





integrable. Hence, µs is well-defined.

















I×T 1{q}(f(i, t))dλ× P Ts .
Since ∑















I×T 1 dλ× P Ts
= 1,
µs is indeed a probability measure. Q.E.D.
We call µs the average signal distribution conditioned on the macro state of
nature. This can be viewed as the conditional probability distribution of a representative
agent’s private information signals. A representative agent is a made-up agent who is
none of the agents but represents all of them. Therefore, a reasonable estimation of her
signal distribution is to take the average of all agents’ signal distributions.
We need to work with a signal process that is independent conditioned on macro
state of nature. As discussed in [49], in order to guarantee the measurability of such a
signal process, we shall work with a joint agent-probability space (I×T, IT , λP Ts )10
that extends the usual measure-theoretic product (I × T, I ⊗ T , λ ⊗ P Ts ) of the agent
space (I, I, λ) and the probability space (T, T , P Ts ) and retains the Fubini property. The
last section will give a detailed exposition on it.
10I  T is a σ-algebra that contains the usual product σ-algebra I ⊗ T , and the restriction of the
countably additive probability measure λ PTs to I ⊗ T is λ⊗ PTs .
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1.3 Private information economy
Economic decisions are in essence made based on a decision maker’s vision of the future.
An investor will continue to hold a stock that has a prospect of an increased return.
A household will set aside a certain amount of its income to the saving account for a
rainy day. All economic agents have to face the trade off between present satisfaction and
future needs. The future is not known yet, hence all decisions are made with some degree
of uncertainty. In this section, we will establish the private information economy model
which is based on the large deterministic pure exchange economy model but has the
feature of uncertainty. In the private information economy model, agents’ characteristics
are contingent on the underlying macro state of nature and signal profiles. Each of them
is informed of a noisy private information signal giving them a clue about the real macro
state of nature, but no direct information about the macro state of nature is available.
Therefore, their choices and consumption plans are made under uncertainty.
The Agent Space
As in the large deterministic pure exchange economy model, the agent space is modeled
by an atomless measure space (I, I, λ) with λ(I) = 1. Such choice of an agent space
ensures the negligibility of an individual agent.
The Commodity Space
We take the commodity space to be the m-dimensional Euclidean space Rm. A com-
modity bundle is a vector x in Rm. Let x = (x1, . . . , xm), where xj is the quantity of the
j-th commodity in the commodity bundle x.
Agent’s Characteristics
Each agent has the following characteristics:
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Consumption Set Each agent i ∈ I is characterized by a consumption set Xi of all
feasible consumption bundles that she can have. For simplicity, we assume Xi =
Rm+ .
Utility Function A utility function u is a mapping from I × Rm+ × S × T to R+.
For i ∈ I, the notation ui is often used to denote the function u(i, ·, ·, ·). For
(c, s, t) ∈ Rm+ × S × T , ui(c, s, t) is agent i’s utility with consumption bundle c
when the macro state of nature is s and the signal profile t is picked. For technical
reasons, we assume that u is measurable with respect to the product σ-algebra of
I, BRm+ and F , where BRm+ is the Borel σ-algebra on Rm+ .
Initial Endowment The mapping e : I × T 0 → Rm+ denotes initial endowments. For
(i, q) ∈ I × T 0, e(i, q) is the initial endowment of agent i when her private infor-
mation signal is q. Initial endowments are the commodities an agent brings to the
market for exchange. In our model, initial endowment of an agent depends on her
private information signal. For each signal profile t ∈ T , we assume that e(i, ti) is
λ-integrable.
Private Information Economy Model
A private information economy model consists of an underlying framework for the mod-
eling of uncertainty, an agent space and a commodity space. Each agent is characterized
by a consumption set, a utility and an initial endowment. In contrast to a determinis-
tic economy model, utility functions and initial endowments depend on the underlying
macro state of nature and private information signals. This model is summarized in the
following definition:
Definition 1.3.1. (Private Information Economy (PIE)) A private information
economy E = {(I × Ω, I  F , λ P ), u, e, (t˜i, i ∈ I), s˜} consists of
1. a probability space (Ω,F , P ) of uncertainty,
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2. a random variable s˜ of the underlying macro state of nature,
3. an atomless measure space of agent (I, I, λ),
4. a commodity space Rm,
5. for each agent i ∈ I,
• a consumption set Xi,
• a utility function ui,
• an initial endowment ei.
• a random variable t˜i of agent i’s private information signal.
1.4 Fubini extension and the exact law of large numbers
In this thesis, a signal process is normally assumed to be independent in one way or
another. When a continuum of agents are involved, however, such a signal process is not
satisfactory for our purpose if we constrain ourselves to the usual product space obtained
via Kolmogorov construction. As pointed out in [49] (see p.32), the sample functions of
an i.i.d. process are essentially equal to an arbitrary function in the usual product space.
To get around this issue, Sun [49] introduced a new product measure space called Fubini
extension, in which an integrable function must possess the usual Fubini property. This
new product space meets our need in that a rich set of meaningful, i.e., measurable and
non-trivial, processes can be found in it. For the sake of completeness, we cite relevant
results from [49] below. An interested reader may want to read the original paper.
Definition 1.4.1. Let (I, I, λ) and (Ω,F , P ) be probability spaces. A probability space
(I × Ω,W, Q) extending the usual product space (I × Ω, I ⊗ F , λ ⊗ P ) is said to be a
Fubini extension of (I × Ω, I ⊗ F , λ⊗ P ) if for any real-valued Q-integrable function
f on (I × Ω,W),
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(1) the two functions fi and fω are integrable respectively on (Ω,F , P ) for λ-almost



















It is noteworthy that an integrable function on (I × Ω, I ⊗ F , λ ⊗ P ) possesses all
the above properties as a result of the classical Fubini Theorem (see [47], p.307 - 308).
However, Fubini Theorem is not applicable in this context since a Q-integrable function
on (I × Ω,W, Q) may not be I ⊗ F-measurable.
In the literature, the notation (I × Ω, I  F , λ P ) is adopted for (I × Ω,W, Q) to
hint its relationship with the two marginal spaces (I, I, λ) and (Ω,F , P ). The reader is
warned of the difference between (I ×Ω, I F , λP ) and (I ×Ω, I ⊗F , λ⊗P ) despite
the resemblance they bear.
It is shown in [49] that with this Fubini extension, an exact law of large numbers can
be proven for a continuum of independent random variables. This theorem and its variant
are the workhorse of this thesis. In the following, we define the notion of essentially
pairwise independence and state the theorem of the exact law of large numbers (see also
Corollary 2.9, [49]).
Definition 1.4.2. Let g be a measurable process from (I×Ω, IF , λP ) to a complete
separable metric space X. g is essentially pairwise independent if for λ-almost all
i ∈ I, it is true that gi and gj are independent for λ-almost all j ∈ I.
Theorem 1.4.3. Let g be a measurable process from (I ×Ω, IF , λP ) to a complete
separable metric space X. Suppose g is essentially pairwise independent. Then for P -
almost all ω ∈ Ω, the cross-sectional distribution λg−1ω of the sample function gω11 is
the same as the distribution (λP )g−1 of the process g viewed as a random variable on
(I × Ω, I  F , λ P ).
11For each ω ∈ Ω, gω is defined as a function from I to X such that gω(i) = g(i, ω).
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If g is essentially pairwise independent, then by the above theorem, λg−1ω = λ  Pg−1












for P -almost ω ∈ Ω.
We summarize this in the following corollary:
Corollary 1.4.4. Let g be a measurable process from (I × Ω, I  F , λ  P ) to Rn.
Suppose g is essentially pairwise independent. Then for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω, Egω =∫
I×Ω g(i, ω)dλ P .
This corollary indicates that if g is a Rn-valued essentially pairwise independent
stochastic process on a Fubini extension, then its sample mean is almost surely equal to
the mean.
In our modeling, (I, I, λ) is reserved exclusively for the agent space and (Ω,F , P ) is
used to model the uncertainty an agent is faced with in economic decision making. We
focus mainly on two types of uncertainty: an agent’s ignorance of the types of other agents
(formally called signal in the thesis) and her lack of knowledge of the true macro state
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of nature. These two sorts of uncertainty are modeled by the measurable spaces (T, T )
and (S,S) respectively. (Ω,F) is then taken to be the product space (S × T,S ⊗ T ),
coupled with a probability measure P of agents’ prior beliefs. Given s ∈ S, we can
derive a conditional probability P Ts on (T, T ). For A ∈ T , P Ts (A) is interpreted as the
probability that event A occurs when the macro state of nature is s. We can also define
the notion of essentially pairwise independence on the conditional probability space. As
it is shown in [49], a theorem similar to Theorem 1.4.3 and a corollary similar to 1.4.4
can be proven as well.
Definition 1.4.5. Let g be a IT -measurable process from I×T to a complete separable
metric space X. It is said to be essentially pairwise independent conditioned on
the macro state random variable s˜ if for each s ∈ S, the process g from (I × T, I 
T , λ P Ts ) to X is essentially pairwise independent.
Theorem 1.4.6. If a process g from I × T to a complete separable metric space X is
essentially pairwise independent conditioned on s˜, then for each s ∈ S, the cross-sectional
distribution λg−1t of the sample function gt is the same as the distribution (λ P Ts )g−1
of the process g viewed as a random variable on (I ×T, I T , λP Ts ) for P Ts -almost all
t ∈ T .
Corollary 1.4.7. Let g be a measurable process from I×T to Rn. Suppose it is essentially
pairwise independent conditioned on s˜. Then for each s ∈ S, Egt =
∫
I×T g(i, t)dλ P Ts
for P Ts -almost all t ∈ T .
This corollary indicates that if g is a Rn-valued conditionally essentially pairwise
independent stochastic process on a Fubini extension, then its sample mean is equal to
the mean almost surely with respect to the conditional probability measure.

Chapter2
On the Existence of Incentive Compatible
and Efficient Rational Expectations
Equilibrium
2.1 Introduction
Radner [45] (see also Allen [2]) extended the finite agent Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie econ-
omy to introduce asymmetric information. In this asymmetric information economy, each
agent is characterized by a random utility function, random initial endowment, a private
information and a prior. The equilibrium notion that Radner put forward is called Ratio-
nal Expectation Equilibrium (REE), which is an extension of the deterministic Walrasian
equilibrium of the Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie model, allowing for asymmetric information.
According to the REE, each individual maximizes interim expected utility conditioned
on her own private information as well as information that the equilibrium prices have
generated. If each agent acts in this way, then the resulting allocation is feasible, i.e.,
clears the markets for every state of nature, and also the resulting REE prices reveal
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all agents’ private information, i.e., prices are measurable with respect to the ”pooled”
private information of all agents.
By now it is well known that in a finite agent economy with asymmetric information,
a rational expectations equilibrium, may not exist 1(see [35]), may not be incentive
compatible, may not be fully or ex-post Pareto optimal and may not be implementable
a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of an extensive form game (see [24]). Thus, if the intent
of the REE notion is to capture contracts among agents under asymmetric information,
then such contacts not only do they not exist universally in well behaved economies (i.e.,
economies with concave, continuous, monotone utility functions and strictly positive
initial endowments), but even if they exist, they fail to have any normative properties,
such as incentive compatibility , Pareto optimality and Bayesian rationality.
The main conceptual difficulty that one encounters with the REE which creates all
the above problems is the fact that individuals are supposed to maximize their interim
expected utility conditioned not only on their own private information, but also on the
information that the equilibrium prices generate. Thus, agents must act as knowing all
the primitives in the economy, which is difficult to justify. Furthermore, the REE notion
ignores the fact that agents have an incentive to manipulate the equilibrium price to
become better off. The REE notion will make sense if each individual in the economy
is negligible, i.e., either no agent has an effect on the equilibrium price or alternatively,
each agent’s effect on the equilibrium price is exactly negligible. In other words, some
kind of perfect competition prevails in the asymmetric information economy.
The main purpose of our work is to introduce a new model where REE concept
becomes free of the problems mentioned above. In particular, we will demonstrate that,
the REE does make sense provided that there is a continuum of agents, whose effect on the
equilibrium price is negligible. In particular, agents’ perceived private information signals
conditioned on an exogenously given macro state of nature are pairwise independent and
1It only exists in a generic sense as Radner [45] and Allen [2] have shown.
2.1 Introduction 31
thus, by the law of large numbers, the influence of each agent on the equilibrium price
is negligible. In such a framework the equilibrium prices reveal no new information.
Indeed, since agents acquire their own information on the realization of the macro state
of nature by receiving noisy private information signals, which are conditionally pairwise
independent, the impact of each agent’s private information signal is negligible.
Our first result shows that a REE exists and its price depends on the exogenously
given macro state of nature only (thus, the REE price is independent of the signal profile
of the agents). Moreover, such a REE is incentive compatible and it is ex-post Pareto
optimal (contrary to the finite agent results in [35] and [24]). The above results are based
on the assumption that the utility of each agent is independent of the exogenous macro
state of nature.
Our second result allows utility functions to depend on the macro state of nature. In
this case, the private information signals of the agents satisfy a stronger independence
condition and it turns out that the resulting REE price is a constant. The latter will
enable us to conclude that the REE is incentive compatible (as the price is independent
of the signal profiles of all agents and the macro state of nature). Furthermore, the REE
turns out to be interim efficient.
The chapter is organized as follows: in section 2.2, we introduce relevant concepts
for the REE model, and give the formal definition of REE and related concepts such as
incentive compatibility and efficiency; in section 2.3, we cover basic assumptions for our
main results and present all the results and their proofs; in section 2.4, we discuss work
in the literature that is related to this chapter. This chapter is based on part of my joint
paper [50] with Professor Yeneng Sun and Professor Nicholas C. Yannelis.
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2.2 Rational expectations equilibrium, incentive compati-
bility and efficiency
Contrary to their counterparts in other general equilibrium economic models, agents in
a rational expectations equilibrium model take prices in a more positive manner. Being
negligible and a price-taker, they have no way to alter the equilibrium price. However,
they make use of the commodity prices and extract from the prices information about the
true macro state of nature. This information will then be used to improve their estimation
of utilities. Their decisions are based on the improved estimation of utilities. This
leads to the notion of rational expectations equilibrium. Before we formally introduce
rational expectations equilibrium, we shall discuss related concepts such as price process,
allocation and interim utility.
A price of commodities is a normalized nonnegative vector p in ∆m, where ∆m is
the unix simplex of Rm+ . Commodity prices vary in different macro states of nature.
Consequently, we need to consider price processes. A price process p˜ is a mapping
from S × T to ∆m. For (s, t) ∈ S × T , p˜(s, t) is the price of commodities when the
macro state of nature is s and the signal profile is t. We assume that p˜ is measurable.
For notational simplicity, the letter p will be used both for a price and a price process.
However, the reader should have no difficulty distinguishing them from the context. The
terms ”price” and ”price process” are used synonymously in this thesis, which causes no
confusion.
An allocation x is a measurable mapping from I ×∆m × T 0 to Rm+ . For (i, p, q) ∈
I ×∆m × T 0, x(i, p, q) is the commodity bundle of agent i when the price is p and her
private information signal is q. Note that xi has no explicit dependence on the macro
state of nature in its definition. The logic is that macro state of nature affects the price
process which in turn affects the allocation.
In our model, an agent’s expenditure is limited to her income. When the commodity
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price is p, an agent with initial endowment e has a total income of pe, where pe is the
usual inner product in Euclidean space. The set of all affordable commodity bundles is
called a budget set. Since an agent’s initial endowment is contingent on her private
information signal q, we usually denote her budget set as Bi(p, q) when the price is p
and her private information signal is q. Hence, Bi(p, q) = {z ∈ Rm+ : pz ≤ pe(i, q)}.
In a real market, commodity prices are usually a good indictor to the health of an
economy. A booming economy typically leads to a soaring cost of commodities and a
contraction in economy results in the fall of prices. Simply put, commodity prices carry
the information of the real state of an economy. More often than not, a sophisticated
agent will rely not only on her private information signal but also on the information
transmitted by prices. Our following definition takes into account this fact.
Given a commodity bundle z, the interim (conditional) expected utility of agent
i is defined as:
Ui(z|p, q) = E{u(i, z, s, t)|p˜ = p, t˜i = q}
where p ∈ ∆m is the price, q ∈ T 0 is the private information signal of agent i. Upon
observing the price p and private information signal q, agent i updates her belief on the
distribution of the macro state of nature and signal profile. She computes her expected
utility based on the updated beliefs. In rational expectations equilibrium, each agent
aims to maximize conditional expected utility subject to her budget constraints.
The formal definition of rational expectations equilibrium is given below:
Definition 2.2.1. (Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE)) A rational expecta-
tions equilibrium for the private information economy E = {(I × Ω, I  F , λ P ), u, e, (t˜i, i ∈ I), s˜}
is a pair of an allocation x∗ and a price process p∗ such that:
1. x∗ is feasible, i.e.,
∫
I x
∗(i, p∗(s, t), ti)dλ =
∫
I e(i, ti)dλ for P -almost all (s, t) ∈
S × T ,
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2. x∗(i, p∗, ti) is a maximizer of the following problem:
max Ui(z|p∗(s, t), ti)
s.t. z ∈ Bi(p∗(s, t), ti)
for λ-almost all i ∈ I and P -almost all (s, t) ∈ S × T .
Condition (1) is the standard feasibility, i.e., market clearing for P -almost all macro
state of nature s and signal profile t.
Condition (2) indicates that agents maximize their interim expected utility (condi-
tioned on the equilibrium price p∗ and their own private information signal ti), subject
to their budget constraint. In other words, condition (2) tells us that each agent, upon
observing the equilibrium price p∗ and relying on her own private information signal ti,
maximizes her interim expected utility subject to the budget constraint. This maximiza-
tion holds for λ-almost all agent i and for P -almost all (s, t).
In the REE model, an agent is limited to the choices in the interim budget set which
depends on commodity prices and private information signal. Although agents have no
way to change the exogenously given private information signals, they may alter the
price for their better. As it is evident from the definition, commodity prices at the
equilibrium depend on the ”pooled” signals (i.e., signal profiles). Thus, an individual
agent can affect the price by misreporting her own private information signal, which in
turn affects her budget set. An agent will choose to misreport her private information
signal deliberately if the new equilibrium prices give her a budget set with improved
expected utility. A question arises naturally whether an agent will have the incentive to
do so? Intuitively, since each agent is negligible, this seems unlikely to happen. What
if we push the question one step beyond: is it possible for a group of agents to form a
coalition and misreport unanimously their private information signals to become better
off? We formulate this question below and will give a partial answer in the next section.
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Definition 2.2.2. (Coalitional Bayesian Incentive Compatibility) A REE (x∗, p∗)
is said to be coalitional Bayesian incentive compatible if for P -almost all (s, t) ∈ S × T
the following property holds:
For every A ∈ I with λ(A) > 0,
Ui(x
∗(i, p∗(s, t), ti)|p∗(s, t), ti) ≥ Ui(x∗(i, p∗(s, t′), ti)|p∗(s, t′), ti),
for any t′A ∈ TA and λ-almost all i ∈ A, where t′ = (tI\A, t′A).
Suppose the signal profile is t. If each agent reports their real private information
signal ti, their conditional expected utilities will be Ui(x
∗(i, p∗(s, t), ti)|p∗(s, t), ti). If
each agent i ∈ A misreports her private information signal as t′i, while those who are
not in the coalition still report their real private information signals, i.e., ti, then the
price will be p∗(s, t′) and the ”pooled” signal profile be t′. Consequently, agent i in the
coalition A will have a conditional expected utility of Ui(x
∗(i, p∗(s, t′), ti)|p∗(s, t′), ti),. If
the REE (x∗, p∗) is coalitional Bayesian incentive compatible, then
Ui(x
∗(i, p∗(s, t), ti)|p∗(s, t), ti) ≥ Ui(x∗(i, p∗(s, t′), ti)|p∗(s, t′), ti).
That means no agent in the coalition A will achieve a higher conditional expected utility
by collectively misreporting their private information signals, they thus have no incentive
to do so. Since the property must hold for each coalition of positive size (i.e., positive
measure), at such a REE, no coalition will have the incentive to misreport their collective
private information signals.
Remark 2.2.3. When A is a singleton, i.e., A = {i}, the above definition reduces to the
standard Individual Bayesian Incentive Compatibility.
It is known (see [25] p.vii, Example 0.3) that contracts which are individual Bayesian
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incentive compatible may not be coalitional Bayesian incentive compatible and there-
fore may not be viable. To this end, we work with a coalitional notion of incentive
compatibility.
The efficiency definitions below are standard and self-explanatory.
Definition 2.2.4. (Ex-post Efficiency) A REE (x∗, p∗) is said to be ex-post efficient
if there does not exist a feasible allocation y : I ×∆m×T 0 → Rm+ such that for P -almost
all (s, t) ∈ S × T :
(1) u(i, y(i, p∗, ti), s, t) > u(i, x∗(i, p∗, ti), s, t) for λ-almost all i ∈ I.
If u is state independent, (1) changes to
(2) u(i, y, t) > u(i, x∗, t) for λ-almost all i ∈ I.
If u depends only on private information signal, (1) changes to
(3) u(i, y, ti) > u(i, x
∗, ti) for λ-almost all i ∈ I.
Definition 2.2.5. (Interim Efficiency) A REE (x∗, p∗) is said to be interim efficient
if there does not exist a feasible allocation y : I ×∆m×T 0 → Rm+ such that for P -almost
all (s, t) ∈ S × T :
Ui(y|p∗, ti) > Ui(x∗|p∗, ti) for λ-almost all i ∈ I.
2.3 Assumptions and results
2.3.1 Assumptions
We list herein all the assumptions that we need to prove our main results.
A1 For P T -almost all t ∈ T , ∫I e(i, ti)dλ 0.
A2 For P T -almost all t ∈ T , ∫I e(i, ti)dλ∞.
A3 For any fixed i ∈ I, s ∈ S and t ∈ T , the utility function u(i, ·, s, t) is continuous
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and strictly monotone.
A4 For any fixed i ∈ I, s ∈ S and t ∈ T , the utility function u(i, ·, s, t) is strictly
concave.
A5 The utility function does not depend on the macro state of nature. That is, u(i, x, s, t) =
u(i, x, s′, t) for any s, s′ ∈ S. In this case, we will simply write it as u(i, x, t).
A6 The utility function depends only on agent’s private information signal. That is,
u(i, x, s, t−i, ti) = u(i, x, s, t′−i, ti) for any t−i, t
′
−i ∈ T−i. In this case, we will simply
write it as u(i, x, s, ti). If A5 also holds, it will be further simplified as u(i, x, ti).
All the above assumptions are standard in equilibrium analysis and need no explana-
tion. The following two definitions indicate two different types of pairwise independence
of the signal process f . A further discussion on pairwise independence can be found in
Definition 1.4.2 and Definition 1.4.5 of Section 1.4, Chapter 1.
A7 The signal process f is essentially pairwise independent. That is, for λ-almost all
i ∈ I, the following property holds: t˜i and t˜j are independent for λ-almost all j ∈ I.
A8 The signal process f is essentially pairwise independent conditioned on the macro
state of nature s˜. That is, for λ-almost all i ∈ I, the following property holds: t˜i
and t˜j are independent conditioned on s˜ for λ-almost j ∈ I.
2.3.2 Results
Theorem 2.3.1. A REE is interim efficient.
Proof: The argument is standard, we only need to work out some details.
We prove it by contradiction. Let (x∗, p∗) be a REE. If it is not interim efficient, then
there exist F ∈ F and a feasible allocation y such that
1. P (F ) > 0,
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∗(s, t), ti)|p∗, ti) > Ui(xi(p∗(s, t), ti)|p∗, ti) (2.1)
for λ-almost all i ∈ I and P -almost all (s, t) ∈ F .
Since x∗i is a maximizer of the following problem
max Ui(z|p∗(s, t), ti)
s.t. z ∈ Bi(p∗(s, t), ti),
for P -almost all (s, t) ∈ S × T and λ-almost all i ∈ I, we must have yi /∈ Bi(p∗(s, t), ti)
for λ-almost all i ∈ I and P -almost all (s, t) ∈ F . This is equivalent to saying that
p∗(s, t)y(i, p∗, ti) > p∗(s, t)e(i, ti) (2.2)
for λ-almost all i ∈ I and P -almost all (s, t) ∈ F .








for P -almost all (s, t) ∈ F .








for P -almost all (s, t) ∈ F , contradicts.
Hence, (x∗, p∗) must be interim efficient.
Theorem 2.3.2. Under the assumptions A1 – A6 and A8, there exists a REE in which
the equilibrium price p depends only on the macro state of nature.
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Proof: We outline the proof first. In Step 1, we consider a large deterministic economy
E¯s for each macro state of nature s ∈ S. Applying the standard Walrasian equilibrium
existence results for large deterministic economies, we can obtain a Walrasian equilibrium
(ys, ps) for each E¯s. In Step 2, we construct a price p and an allocation x from the
collection of allocation-price pairs {(ys, ps) : s ∈ S}, and show that (x, p) is a REE with
equilibrium price depending only on the macro state of nature.
Step 1: Define a mapping Γ from I×T to I×T 0 by letting Γ(i, t) = (i, ti) for (i, t) ∈ I×T .
We claim that Γ is a measurable mapping in the sense that Γ−1(D) ∈ I  T for all
D ∈ I ⊗ T 0.
To prove this, it suffices to show that for all D of the form A×B, where A ∈ I and
B ∈ T 0, we have Γ−1(D) ∈ I  T .
Let f be the signal process, then
Γ−1(A×B)
= {(i, t) ∈ I × T : i ∈ A, f(i, t) ∈ B}
= {(i, t) ∈ I × T : i ∈ A} ∩ {(i, t) ∈ I × T : f(i, t) ∈ B}
= A× T ∩ f−1(B).
Since f is assumed to be measurable, f−1(B) ∈ I  T . Hence, Γ−1(A × B) = A × T ∩
f−1(B) ∈ I  T .
Thus, Γ is measurable.
Since A5 and A6 hold, we can write the utility function as u(i, z, q) for (i, z, q) ∈
I × Rm+ × T 0.







for D ∈ I ⊗ T 0.
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We can introduce a large deterministic economy E¯s = {(I × T 0, I ⊗ T 0, νs), Vs, e},
where the utility function for agent (i, q) ∈ I × T 0 is Vs(i, q, ·) = u(i, ·, q) and the initial
endowment for agent (i, q) is e(i, q). By the standard Walrasian equilibrium existence
results (see Theorem 1.1.6, Chapter 1), there is a Walrasian equilibrium for the economy
E¯s. That is, there exists a price ps ∈ ∆m and an allocation ys of a measurable mapping
from I × T 0 to Rm+ such that:
1. ys is feasible, i.e.,
∫
I×T 0 ys(i, ti)dνs =
∫
I×T 0 e(i, ti)dνs, and
2. for νs-almost all agent (i, q) ∈ I × T 0, ys(i, q) is a maximal element in her budget
set B(i,q)(ps) = {y ∈ Rm+ : psy ≤ pse(i, q)}. 2
Step 2: Let P0 = {ps : s ∈ S} be the set of all equilibrium prices. We define a mapping
x from I ×∆m × T 0 to Rm+ by letting
x(i, p, q) =
 ys(i, q) if p ∈ P0 for some s ∈ Se(i, q) otherwise.
For any p ∈ P0, if there is only one macro state of nature s ∈ S such that ps = p,
the choice of s is unique. A problem will occur if there exist at least two different macro
states of nature s, s′ ∈ S such that ps = ps′ = p. In this case, the choice of s is not
unique. However, when ps = ps′ , agent (i, q) has the same budget set in these two
different macro states of nature. By the strict concavity of the utility function, we know
that the maximal element in the budget set is unique. Hence, ys(i, q) = ys′(i, q), and it
follows immediately that the above allocation x is well-defined.
Define p(s, t) = ps for each s ∈ S, t ∈ T . By definition, p(s, t) depends only on macro
state of nature. For this reason, we also write it as p(s). We will complete the proof by
showing that (x, p) is a REE for the private information economy E .
2By modifying the values of ys on a null set (if necessary), we can assume that for every (i, q) ∈ I×T 0,
ys(i, q) is a maximal element in her budget set.
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e(i, ti)dλ P Ts . (2.6)
Since A8 holds, by the exact law of large numbers (see Corollary 1.4.7, Chapter 1),
there exists Ts ∈ T with P Ts (Ts) = 1 such that
∫
I×T










for every t ∈ Ts.







for every t ∈ Ts.







for every t ∈ Ts.
Since ys is a feasible allocation for economy E¯s, combined with Equation (2.9) and
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for every t ∈ Ts.
Let Ω0 =
⋃
s∈S{s} × Ts, then P (Ω0) = 1. For any (s, t) ∈ Ω0, by construction
x(i, p(s), ti) = ys(i, ti), and thus,
∫
I







Hence, x is feasible. It is left to show that for each agent i ∈ I, xi maximizes the
conditional expected utility Ui subject to her budget constraint.
Notice that
Ui(x|p(s), ti) = E{u(i, x, ti)|p˜ = p(s), t˜i = ti} = u(i, x, ti). (2.12)
The last equality in Equation (2.12) holds since agent i knows her private information
signal ti.
For each (s, t) ∈ Ω0, agent i’s budget set is Bi(p(s, t), ti) = {y ∈ Rm+ : p(s)y ≤
p(s)e(i, ti)}. This is exactly the same as the budget set B(i,ti)(ps) of agent (i, ti) in the
deterministic economy E¯s. Since Vs(i, ·, ti) = u(i, ·, ti) = Ui (·|p(s), ti), the following two
problems are equivalent:
Problem (I)
max Vs(i, z, ti)
s.t. z ∈ B(i,ti)(p(s))
and
Problem (II)
max Ui (z|p(s), ti)
s.t. z ∈ Bi(p(s, t), ti)
Since ys(i, ti) is a maximizer for Problem (I), it must be a maximizer for Problem (II)
as well. By definition, x(i, p(s), ti) = ys(i, ti). Hence, x(i, p(s), ti) is a maximizer for
Problem (II). That is to say that x(i, p(s), ti) maximizes Ui(·|p(s), ti) subject to the
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budget set Bi(p(s, t), ti).
In conclusion, (x, p) constitutes a REE for the private information economy E . Q.E.D.
Corollary 2.3.3. Any REE in which the equilibrium price depends only on the macro
state of nature must be coalitional Bayesian incentive compatible.
Proof: When p depends only on s, i.e., p(s, t) = p(s), we have p(s, t) = p(s, tI\A, t′A) for
any A ∈ I with λ(A) > 0 and t′A ∈ TA, and it immediately follows that
Ui(x(i, p(s, t), ti)|p, ti) = Ui(x(i, p(s, t′), ti)|p, ti), for any i ∈ A ,
where t′ = (tI\A, t′A). Thus, such a REE is coalitional Bayesian incentive compatible.
Q.E.D.
Corollary 2.3.4. Under the assumptions A1 – A6 and A8, there exists a REE which
is coalitional Bayesian incentive compatible and ex-post efficient.
Proof: Let (x, p) be the REE constructed in the proof of Theorem 2.3.2. We shall show
that (x, p) is the desired REE.
Since p depends only on macro state of nature, by Corollary 2.3.3, it is coalitional
Bayesian incentive compatible.
We shall now prove that (x, p) is also ex-post efficient.
We prove it by contradiction. Suppose (x, p) is not ex-post efficient. Then there
exists a feasible allocation z such that
u(i, z(i, p, ti), ti) > u(i, x(i, p, ti), ti) (2.13)
for λ-almost all i ∈ I and P -almost all (s, t) ∈ S × T .
Note that Ui(z|p(s), ti) = u(i, z, ti) and Ui(x|p(s), ti) = u(i, x, ti) (see Equation 2.12),
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we have
Ui(z|p(s), ti) > Ui(x|p(s), ti),
for λ-almost all i ∈ I and P -almost all (s, t) ∈ S × T .
This implies x is not interim efficient, contradicting Theorem 2.3.1. Q.E.D.
Theorem 2.3.2 can be interpreted as follows. Suppose that agent’s utility functions
are state independent. There is an exogenous macro state of nature and agents re-
ceive noisy private information signals. If the private information signals are pairwise
independent conditioned on the macro state of nature, then each individual’s private
information signal has negligible influence on the resulting REE price and indeed, the
resulting REE price depends only on the macro state of nature. Since the resulting REE
price is independent on the signal profile, it turns out (Corollary 2.3.3) that the REE is
coalitional Bayesian incentive compatible (and thus individual Bayesian incentive com-
patible). Furthermore, the REE is ex-post efficient (Corollary 2.3.4). Notice that we
assumed strict concavity of the utility functions. In principle, such an assumption is
typically not needed for the existence proof with a continuum of agents (the Lyapunov
Theorem provides a convexifying effect on aggregation as it is well known). However, we
needed this assumption for one of the steps in the proof. Although we conjecture that
this assumption could be dispensed with, at this stage we do not know how to proceed
without it. As the reader will notice this strict concavity assumption is not needed for
Theorem 2.3.5 below.
Theorem 2.3.5. Under the assumptions A1 – A3 and A7, then there exists a REE in
which the equilibrium price p is a constant.
Proof: This proof is similar to that of Theorem 2.3.2, but some changes are needed.
We outline the argument first. In Step 1, we consider a large deterministic economy
E¯ . Applying the standard Walrasian equilibrium existence results for large deterministic
economies, we can obtain a Walrasian equilibrium (y, p¯). In Step 2, we construct a price
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p and an allocation x from (y, p¯), and show that (x, p) is a REE with equilibrium price
being a constant.
Step 1: Define a mapping Γ from I × T to I × T 0 by letting Γ(i, t) = (i, ti) for all
(i, t) ∈ I × T . As it was shown in the proof of Theorem 2.3.2, Γ is a measurable
mapping.







for D ∈ I ⊗ T 0.
Let V(i,ti)(·) = E{u(i, ·, s, t)|t˜i = ti}. We consider the deterministic economy E¯ ={
(I × T 0, I ⊗ T 0, ν), V, e}. By the standard Walrasian equilibrium existence results,
there is a Walrasian equilibrium for the economy E¯ . That is, there exists a price p¯ ∈ ∆m
and an allocation y of a measurable mapping from I × T 0 to Rm+ such that:
1. y is feasible, i.e.,
∫
I×T 0 y(i, ti)dν =
∫
I×T 0 e(i, ti)dν, and
2. for ν-almost all agent (i, q) ∈ I × T 0, y(i, q) is a maximal element in her budget
B(i,q)(p¯) = {z ∈ Rm+ : p¯z ≤ p¯e(i, q)}.3
Step 2: Let p(s, t) = p¯ for (s, t) ∈ S × T . It is a constant. We further define
x(i, p, q) =
 y(i, q) if p = p¯e(i, q) otherwise.
We will complete the proof by showing that x and p constitute a REE for the private
information economy E .
3By modifying the values of y on a null set (if necessary), we can assume that for every (i, q) ∈ I×T 0,
y(i, q) is a maximal element in her budget set.
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e(i, ti)dλ P T . (2.15)
Since A7 holds, by the exact law of large numbers (see Corollary 1.4.4, Chapter 1),
∫
I×T










for P T -almost all t ∈ T .







for P T -almost all t ∈ T .
By the definition of x, x(i, p, ti) = y(i, ti). Hence
∫
I




for P T -almost all t ∈ T .
Since P T is the marginal probability measure, it then follows that Equation (2.19)
must hold for P -almost all (s, t) ∈ S × T . x is thus feasible. It is left to show that for
each agent i ∈ I, xi maximizes the conditional expected utility Ui subject to her budget
constraint.
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When the price p is a constant, it carries no information regarding the macro state
of nature. It then follows that
Ui(·|p, q) = V(i,q)(·). (2.20)
Since agent i’s budget set is Bi(p, ti) = {z ∈ Rm+ : pz ≤ pe(i, ti)} when the signal
profile is t, Bi(p, ti) = B(i,ti)(p¯). Combining this fact with Equation (2.20), we know the
following two problems are equivalent.
Problem (I)
max V (i, z, ti)
s.t. z ∈ B(i,ti)(p¯)
and
Problem (II)
max Ui (z|p, ti)
s.t. z ∈ Bi(p, ti)
for P -almost all (s, t) ∈ S × T .
By a similar argument as in the proof of Theorem 2.3.2, we conclude that x(i, p, ti)
maximizes Ui(·|p, ti) subject to the budget set Bi(p, ti) for P -almost all (s, t) ∈ S × T .
Hence, (x, p) constitutes a REE for the private information economy E . Q.E.D.
Corollary 2.3.6. Any REE in which the equilibrium price is a constant must be coali-
tional Bayesian incentive compatible.
Proof: Note that p is exactly a constant function of s, by Corollary 2.3.3, we know that
such a REE is coalitional Bayesian incentive compatible. Q.E.D.
Corollary 2.3.7. Under the assumptions A1 – A3 and A7, there exists a REE which
is coalitional Bayesian incentive compatible and interim efficient.
Proof: The proof of Corollary 2.3.4 works perfectly well here, hence we do not detail
the proof anymore. Q.E.D.
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Notice that in Theorem 2.3.5, utility functions are state dependent (contrary to The-
orem 2.3.2). In this case, a stronger independence condition is used, (i.e., agent’s private
signals are unconditionally independent), and in this case the resulting REE price turns
out to be constant. Thus, the REE is coalitional Bayesian incentive compatible (Corol-
lary 2.3.6) and also interim efficient (Corollary 2.3.7). It should be noted that assumption
A6, i.e., the utility function of agent i depends on her own private information signal
ti, is not needed for the proof of Theorem 2.3.5. Indeed, in Theorem 2.3.5, the utility of
each agent i depends on the signal profile t.
2.4 Discussion
In this section we discuss models of asymmetric information economies with a continuum
of agents which have adopted the REE notion. Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz [19] con-
sider an asymmetric information economy with a continuum (atomless measure space)
of agents and a finite number of states of nature. The private information of each agent
is a partition of exogenously given finite number of states of nature space. Notice that
if we were to partition the atomless measure space into a finite set of partitions, then
in each partition agents will have the same private information, and therefore there is
no much heterogeneity on the private information side of this model. At the same time,
in their model there is no negligibility of the private information for each individual.
Nonetheless, they show that a fully revealing REE is in the ex-post core (hence it is
ex-post efficient). Also, they provide a counterexample indicating that a non-revealing
REE need not be in the ex-post core. Furthermore, with additional assumptions they
show that the REE coincides with the ex-post core. In a companion paper, Einy, Moreno
and Shitovitz [18] show that every pooled information (fine) core allocation is also a REE
allocation. This work is not directly related to ours because aside from not having private
information negligibility, the asymmetry of information is rather limited as each agent’s
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private information is a partition of a finite state space. Heifetz and Minelli [26] do try
to model the idea of informational smallness for an asymmetric information economy
with a continuum of agents (continuum replica economy). However, the formulation of
REE they are using is based on the Pettis integral (Definition 6, p.213) and thus their
feasibility notion is not consistent with the idea that total consumption is equal to total
initial endowment. The problems associated with the feasibility of allocations in the Pet-
tis integration are well known (see [49] and [55] for a discussion of this issue). Moreover,
the use of the Pettis integration to bypass the problem of joint measurability in order
to obtain a law of large numbers is not meaningful as it is noted in [49]. In the replica
economy that Heifetz and Minelli are using, there is no private information negligibility
and the resulting REE may not be incentive compatible (p.213). To get around this
difficulty they introduce a notion of weakly focused REE. In a weakly focused REE,
the prices for two different states must coincide when the posteriors of almost all agents
are the same across these two states. They show that any weakly focused REE price is
constant and thus it is incentive compatible.

Chapter3
Rational Expectations Equilibrium with
Aggregate Signals
3.1 Introduction
So far, most work on Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE) in the literature revolves
around two issues: to which extent do the market prices reveal information and what is
the strategic foundation for the notion of REE? In Radner’s REE model (see [45] and [2]),
the equilibrium price fully reveals all agents’ private information (which mathematically
means that the price is measurable with respect to the aggregate types of all agents).
In the real market, however, it is difficult to reason that prices transmit all the private
information. Allen [1] provided an example of a non-revealing REE in a simple model
with two commodities (but one price) and two information signals. Polemarchakis and
Siconolfi [43] demonstrated the existence of non-informative expectations equilibria in an
asset market. As a matter of fact, if the price is required to be fully-revealing, then REE
may not exist (see Section 2 of [32] for a counterexample). Thus, many efforts have been
devoted to the study of partially revealing (or non-revealing) REE or approximate REE.
For example, Ausubel [11] considered partial revealing rational expectations equilibrium
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for a class of economies where some agents are informed of private information and
others are not. Allen [3] studied information transmission and approximate rationality
in economies with heterogeneously informed agents (see also [6], [27] and [14]). One
controversial implication in the REE notion is that the price function must be common
knowledge to agents before they make consumption decision. Most attempts to explain
this question led to the consideration of strategic foundation for the REE model. For
example, Hellwig [28] introduced noisy traders in the model. Reny and Perry [46] took
an approach by considering a double auction model. Blume [13] adopted the idea of an
informative market process in which uncertainty is gradually being unveiled.
However, it is not our attempt to tackle the above-mentioned questions. In this
chapter, we study REE from a different angle and refine the REE notation by introducing
the so-called empirical signal distribution.
As we all know, macroeconomic statistics such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP),
export/import and exchange rate are usually good indicators of the health of an economy.
Economic policy makers of a country rely on these statistics in crafting new economic
policies. The information conveyed in these macroeconomic statistics is beneficial to
individuals as well. An economic agent can make efficient use of these macroeconomic
information in individual economic activities. This is especially important since it is
impractical, and oftentimes useless, for an individual agent to know all the details about
other agents in a large economy. For example, it is impossible for an electronic device
company to know the income of every individual household in a country. However, all
relevant statistics about household income of this country are readily available from
its national statistics bureaucracy with little cost. The company will certainly plan its
production according to those statistics. If market survey indicates that only 5 percent
of households that can afford a certain electronic device will make a purchase and the
macro statistics show that 1 million households have the income to afford the electronic
device, it is sensible for the company not to exceed its production to 50,000.
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Moreover, these macroeconomic statistics will give us a better insight into the un-
derlying uncertainty. For instance, a continuing decrease in a country’s export probably
signals a shift in its export policy or a worsening economic situation of its partner country.
In short, macroeconomic statistics are as valuable as the private information an eco-
nomic agent possesses. The information conveyed in these statistics unveils the underly-
ing economic reality. Therefore, aside from her private information signal, an economic
agent shall make use of these information from macroeconomic statistics in their eco-
nomic decision making. In the REE model of Chapter 2, agents exploit information
transmitted by commodity prices to better estimate their utility. We take a further step
by allowing agents to use one more macroeconomic statistic, namely, empirical signal
distribution. Given a signal profile, the corresponding empirical signal distribution is
the percentage of population that receive a certain private information signal. The new
notion of equilibrium is called Rational Expectations Equilibrium with Aggregate Sig-
nals. In REE with aggregate signals, an agent makes inference about the information
from commodity prices and empirical signal distribution. She estimates her utility with
the assistance of these information. A choice of consumption is then made from her
budget set to maximize the expected utility.
As it will be shown later, this extra piece of information from the empirical signal
distribution is extremely useful. When the signal process is essentially pairwise indepen-
dent conditioned on the macro state of nature, the empirical signal distribution is exactly
the same as the average signal distribution (see Section 1.2.2 of Chapter 1) by the exact
law of large numbers. Hence, agents can identify the macro state of nature by learning
the empirical signal distribution, which makes their estimation of utility more accurate.
In this case, our first result (Theorem 3.3.2) shows that the resulting equilibrium price
depends only on the macro state of nature. Furthermore, when the signal process is
essentially pairwise independent (unconditionally), the equilibrium price is a constant
(Theorem 3.3.5).
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In contrast to REE model, agents in the REE with aggregate signal model have
more sway on other agents’ decision. They not only affect the commodity price by
their own choices of consumption but also affect the ”pooled” signals of the empirical
signal distribution. In particular, an agent can construe the empirical signal distribution
by misreporting her own private information signal. This raises the issue of incentive
compatibility. An agent or a group of agents will misreport their private information
signals if doing so makes them better off. However, our results (Corollary 3.3.4 and
Corollary 3.3.7) show that the effort of forming a coalition and misreporting private
information signals is futile when an agent’s private information signal is independent of
others’. When their private information signals are pairwise independent, the resulting
equilibrium prices are independent of the signal profile and empirical signal distribution.
Hence, misreporting private information signal will not affect the price, which in turn
will not affect the budget set of each agent. This is to say that agents are faced with
the same options even if they misreport their private information signals. Therefore, no
improvement of utility will be achieved by doing so.
This chapter is organized as follows: in section 3.2 we introduce empirical signal
distribution and define the concept of rational expectations equilibrium with aggregate
signals and related concepts such as incentive compatibility and efficiency; in section 3.3,
we cover basic assumptions and present all main results and their proofs; in section 3.4
we discuss related work in the literature and give suggestion on further research based on
our model. This chapter is based on part of my joint paper [50] with Professor Yeneng
Sun and Professor Nicholas C. Yannelis.
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3.2 Rational expectations equilibrium with aggregate sig-
nals
In this section, we will first define empirical signal distribution and then introduce ratio-
nal expectations equilibrium with aggregate signals model. The existence of equilibrium
for this model will be proven in the next section.
3.2.1 Empirical signal distribution
We use the private information model as discussed in Chapter 1. The reader can refer
to that chapter for details. The concepts that are new to the reader are empirical signal
distribution and empirical signal distribution process.
Let E = {(I × Ω, I  F , λ P ), u, e, (t˜i, i ∈ I), s˜} be a private information economy.
A signal process f is a IT -measurable mapping from I×T to T 0 such that f(i, t) = ti.
For any t ∈ T , the empirical signal distribution is λf−1t where ft = f(·, t). For
q ∈ T 0, λf−1t ({q}) is the fraction of agents whose signal is q when the signal profile is
t ∈ T .
Let ∆(T 0) be the set of all probability distributions on T 0. It is clear that λf−1t ∈
∆(T 0). Therefore, λf−1t ({q}) can be interpreted as the probability that an anonymous
agent receives a private information signal q when the signal profile is t.
The empirical signal distribution process is a random variable µ˜ from S × T to
∆(T 0) such that µ˜(s, t) = λf−1t .
3.2.2 Rational expectations equilibrium with aggregate signals, incen-
tive compatibility and efficiency
A price or price process p˜ is a measurable mapping from S × T ×∆(T 0) to ∆m. For
(s, t, µ) ∈ S×T×∆(T 0), p˜(s, t, µ) is the commodity price when the macro state of nature
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is s , signal profile is t and empirical signal distribution is µ.
An allocation x is a mapping from I×∆m×T 0×∆(T 0) to Rm+ . For each µ ∈ ∆(T 0),
x(·, ·, ·, µ) is assumed to be measurable with respect to the product σ-algebra of I, BRm+
and T 0. For (i, p, q, µ) ∈ I ×∆m × T 0 ×∆(T 0), x(i, p, q, µ) is the commodity bundle of
agent i when the price is p, her private information signal is q and the empirical signal
distribution is µ.
Given a commodity bundle z, the interim (conditional) expected utility of agent
i is defined as:
Ui(z|p, q, µ) = E{u(i, z, s, t)|p˜ = p, t˜i = q, µ˜ = µ} (3.1)
where p ∈ ∆m is the price, q ∈ T 0 is the private information signal of agent i and
µ ∈ ∆(T 0) is the empirical signal distribution.
In the REE with aggregate signals model, agent i updates her belief on the distri-
bution of macro state of nature and signal profile upon observing the price p, private
information signal q and empirical signal distribution µ. Each agent aims to maximize
her expected utility subject to her budget constraint.
Definition 3.2.1. (Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE) with Aggregate
Signals) Let E = {(I × Ω, I  F , λ P ), u, e, (t˜i, i ∈ I), s˜} be a private information
economy. A REE with aggregate signals for E is an allocation-price pair of x∗ and
p∗ such that:
1. x∗ is feasible, i.e.,
∫
I x




I e(i, ti)dλ for P -almost
all (s, t) ∈ S × T , and
2. for λ-almost all i ∈ I and P -almost all (s, t) ∈ S × T , x∗i is a maximizer of the
following problem:
max Ui(z|p∗, ti, λf−1t )
s.t. p∗(s, t, λf−1t )z ≤ p∗(s, t, λf−1t )e(i, ti)
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Condition (i) is the standard feasibility, i.e., market clearing for all macro state s and
signal profile t.
Condition (ii) indicates that agents maximize their interim expected utility (con-
ditioned on the equilibrium price p∗, their own private information signal ti and the
empirical signal distribution λf−1t ), subject to their budget constraint. This holds for
P -almost all (s, t) ∈ S × T . In other words, condition (ii) tells us that each agent, upon
observing the equilibrium price p∗ and empirical signal distribution λf−1t and relying on
her own private information signal ti, maximizes her interim expected utility subject to
the budget constraint. This maximization holds for λ-almost all agent i and for P -almost
all (s, t) ∈ S × T .
An informal interpretation of REE with aggregation signals is based on self-fulfilling
mechanism introduced by Forges in [23]. In the setup, each agent is informed of a
private information signal. They report their private information signals to a mediator.
The mediator announces the empirical signal distribution and proposes a price function.
Agents make inferences about the underlying uncertainty from private information signal,
the price function and empirical signal distribution and update their expected utility.
They then play a market game by choosing an optimal commodity bundle from their
budget sets, which generates market prices of commodity. At equilibrium, market prices
are equal to the proposed prices.
As in the REE model, since the price depends on the ”pooled” information, agents
may manipulate their private information signals to become better off. The related
concept to this issue is called incentive compatibility. Informally, a REE with aggregate
signals is incentive compatible if no agent has the incentive to misreport their private
information signals. The formal definition is given below.
Definition 3.2.2. (Coalitional Bayesian Incentive Compatibility) A REE with
aggregate signals (x∗, p∗) is said to be coalitional Bayesian incentive compatible if for
P -almost all (s, t) ∈ S × T the following property holds:
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For every A ∈ I with λ(A) > 0 and t′A ∈ TA,
Ui
(
x∗(i, p∗(s, t, λf−1t ), ti, λf
−1




x∗(i, p∗(s, t′, λf−1t′ ), ti, λf
−1
t )|p∗(s, t′, λf−1t′ ), ti, λf−1t
)
,
for λ-almost all i ∈ A, where t′ = (tI\A, t′A).
Suppose the signal profile is t. If each agent reports their real private information
signal ti, their conditional expected utilities will be
Ui
(
x∗(i, p∗(s, t, λf−1t ), ti, λf
−1
t )|p∗(s, t, λf−1t ), ti, λf−1t
)
.
If each agent i ∈ A misreports her private information signal as t′i, while those who are
not in the coalition still report their real private information signals, i.e., ti, then the
”pooled” signal profile is t′ = (tI\A, t′A). Consequently, agent i in the coalition A will
have a conditional expected utility of
Ui
(
x∗(i, p∗(s, t′, λf−1t′ ), ti, λf
−1
t )|p∗(s, t′, λf−1t′ ), ti, λf−1t
)
.




x∗(i, p∗(s, t, λf−1t ), ti, λf
−1




x∗(i, p∗(s, t′, λf−1t′ ), ti, λf
−1
t )|p∗(s, t′, λf−1t′ ), ti, λf−1t
)
,
for agents in the coalition A.
That means no agent in the coalition A will achieve a higher conditional expected
utility by collectively misreporting their private information signals, they thus have no
incentive to do so. Since the property must hold for each coalition of positive size (i.e.,
positive measure), at such a REE with aggregate signals, no coalition will have the
incentive to misreport their collective private information signals.
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Remark 3.2.3. When A is a singleton, i.e., A = {i}, the above definition reduces to the
standard Individual Bayesian Incentive Compatibility.
Definition 3.2.4. (Interim Efficiency) A REE with aggregate signals (x∗, p∗) is said
to be interim efficient if there does not exist a feasible allocation y : I×∆m×T 0×∆(T 0)→
Rm+ such that for P -almost all (s, t) ∈ S × T :
Ui(y|p∗, ti, λf−1t ) > Ui(x|p∗, ti, λf−1t )
for λ-almost all i ∈ I.
3.3 Assumptions and results
3.3.1 Assumptions
We list the assumptions that will be needed for our theorems and corollaries.
A1 For P T -almost all t ∈ T , ∫I e(i, ti)dλ 0.
A1 For P T -almost all t ∈ T , ∫I e(i, ti)dλ∞.
A3 For any fixed i ∈ I, s ∈ S and t ∈ T , the utility function u(i, ·, s, t) is continuous
and strictly monotone.
A4 The utility function does not depend on the macro state of nature. That is, u(i, x, s, t) =
u(i, x, s′, t) for any s, s′ ∈ S. In this case, we will simply write it as u(i, x, t).
A5 For any s, s′ ∈ S, s 6= s′ implies µs 6= µs′ . This is, the average signal distributions
are distinct at different states.
A6 The signal process f is essentially pairwise independent. That is, for λ-almost all
i ∈ I, the following property holds: t˜i and t˜j are independent for λ-almost all j ∈ I.
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A7 The signal process f is essentially pairwise independent conditioned on the macro
state s˜. That is, for λ-almost all i ∈ I, the following property holds: t˜i and t˜j are
independent conditioned on s˜ for λ-almost j ∈ I.
3.3.2 Results
Theorem 3.3.1. A REE with aggregate signals is interim efficient.
Proof: This proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 2.3.1 in Chapter 2, hence will not
be repeated here.
Theorem 3.3.2. Suppose assumptions A1 – A3, A5 and A7 hold, then there exists a
REE with aggregate signals in which the equilibrium price p depends only on the macro
state of nature.
Proof: We outline the proof first. In Step 1, we consider a large deterministic economy
E¯s for each macro state of nature s ∈ S. Applying the standard Walrasian equilibrium
existence results for large deterministic economies, we can obtain a Walrasian equilibrium
(ys, ps) for each E¯s. In Step 2, we construct a price p and an allocation x from the
collection of allocation-price pairs {(ys, ps) : s ∈ S}, and show that (x, p) is a REE
with aggregate signals in which the equilibrium price depends only on the macro state
of nature.
Step 1: Define a mapping Γ from I×T to I×T 0 by letting Γ(i, t) = (i, ti) for (i, t) ∈ I×T .
As it is shown in the proof of Theorem 2.3.2 in Chapter 2, Γ is a measurable mapping
in the sense that Γ−1(D) ∈ I  T for all D ∈ I ⊗ T 0.







for D ∈ I ⊗ T 0.
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We can introduce a large deterministic economy E¯s = {(I × T 0, I ⊗ T 0, νs), Vs, e},
where the utility function for agent (i, q) ∈ I × T 0 is
Vs(i, q, ·) = E{u(i, ·, s, t)|s˜ = s, t˜i = q} (3.2)
and the initial endowment for agent (i, q) is e(i, q). By the standard Walrasian equilib-
rium existence results (see Theorem 1.1.6, Chapter 1), there is a Walrasian equilibrium
for the economy E¯s. That is, there exists a price ps ∈ ∆m and an allocation ys of a
measurable mapping from I × T 0 to Rm+ such that:
1. ys is feasible, i.e.,
∫
I×T 0 ys(i, ti)dνs =
∫
I×T 0 e(i, ti)dνs, and
2. for νs-almost all agent (i, q) ∈ I × T 0, ys(i, q) is a maximal element in her budget
set B(i,q)(ps) = {y ∈ Rm+ : psy ≤ pse(i, q)}. 1
Step 2: Let P0 = {ps : s ∈ S} be the set of all equilibrium prices. We define a mapping
x from I ×∆m × T 0 ×∆(T 0) to Rm+ by letting
x(i, p, q, µ) =
 ys(i, q) if p = ps and µ = µs for some s ∈ Se(i, q) otherwise.
Since A5 holds, there is at most one s such that µ = µs. Hence, x is well-defined.
Define p(s, t, λf−1t ) = ps for each (s, t) ∈ S × T . By definition, p(s, t, λf−1t ) depends
only on macro state of nature. For this reason, we also write it as p(s). We will com-
plete the proof by showing that (x, p) is a REE with aggregate signals for the private
information economy E .
As it is shown in the proof of Theorem 2.3.2, Chapter 2, since A7 holds, by the
exact law of large numbers (see Corollary 1.4.7, Chapter 1), there exists Ts ∈ T with
1By modifying the values of ys on a null set (if necessary), we can assume that for every (i, q) ∈ I×T 0,
ys(i, q) is a maximal element in her budget set.
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for every t ∈ Ts.
Let Ω0 =
⋃
s∈S{s} × Ts, then P (Ω0) = 1. For any (s, t) ∈ Ω0, since A7 holds,
Theorem 1.4.6 of Chapter 1 implies λ P Ts f−1 = λf−1t (i.e., µs = λf−1t ) for P Ts -almost
all t ∈ T . Without loss of generality, we may assume λP Ts f−1 = λf−1t for every t ∈ Ts.
Hence, according to the definition of x, x(i, p(s), ti, λf
−1
t ) = ys(i, ti), and thus,
∫
I









Hence, x is feasible. It is left to show that for each agent i ∈ I, xi maximizes the
conditional expected utility Ui subject to her budget constraint.
Under the assumption of A5, agents know exactly which macro state of nature they
are in upon observing the empirical signal distribution. Hence
Ui(·|p, q, λf−1t ) = E{u(i, ·, s, t)|s˜ = s, t˜i = ti} = Vs(i, ·, q). (3.4)
For each (s, t) ∈ Ω0, agent i’s budget set is Bi(p(s, t, λf−1t ), ti) = {y ∈ Rm+ : p(s)y ≤
p(s)e(i, ti)}. This is exactly the same as the budget set B(i,ti)(ps) of agent (i, ti) in the
deterministic economy E¯s. Since Vs(i, ·, ti) = Ui
(· | p(s, t, λf−1t ), ti, λf−1t ), the following
two problems are equivalent:
Problem (I)
max Vs(i, z, ti)





z | p(s), ti, λf−1t
)
s.t. z ∈ Bi(p(s, t, λf−1t ), ti)
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Since ys(i, ti) is a maximizer for Problem (I), it must be a maximizer for Problem (II)
as well. By definition, x(i, p(s), ti, λf
−1
t ) = ys(i, ti). Hence, x(i, p(s), ti, λf
−1
t ) is a maxi-
mizer for Problem (II). That is to say that x(i, p(s), ti, λf
−1
t ) maximizes Ui(·|p(s), ti, λf−1t )
subject to the budget set Bi(p(s, t, λf
−1
t ), ti) for P -almost all (s, t) ∈ S × T .
Hence, (x, p) constitutes a REE with aggregate signals for the private information
economy E . Q.E.D.
Corollary 3.3.3. Any REE with aggregate signals in which the equilibrium price depends
only on the macro state of nature must be coalitional Bayesian incentive compatible.
Proof: Let (s, t) ∈ S × T . For any A ∈ I with λ(A) > 0 and t′A ∈ TA. Since p depends
only on s, i.e., p(s, t, λf−1t ) = p(s), we have
p(s, t, λf−1t ) = p(s, t
′, λf−1t′ ),
where t′ = (tI\A, t′A). Hence
Ui
(
x∗(i, p∗(s, t, λf−1t ), ti, λf
−1




x∗(i, p∗(s, t′, λf−1t′ ), ti, λf
−1
t )|p∗(s, t′, λf−1t′ ), ti, λf−1t
)
,
Thus, such a REE with aggregate signals is coalitional Bayesian incentive compatible.
Q.E.D.
Corollary 3.3.4. Suppose assumptions A1 – A3, A5 and A7 hold, then there exists
a REE with aggregate signals which is coalitionally Bayesian incentive compatible and
interim efficient.
Proof: The statement follows from Theorem 3.3.1, Theorem 3.3.2 and Corollary 3.3.3.
Q.E.D.
Theorem 3.3.2 can be interpreted as follows. Under the assumption A5, agents
know the exact macro state of nature via the empirical signal distribution. Hence their
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decisions are made state-wise. If the private information signals are pairwise independent
conditioned on the macro state of nature, then each individual’s private information
signal has negligible influence on the resulting REE with aggregate signals price and
indeed, the resulting REE with aggregate signals price depends only on the macro state
of nature s. Since the resulting REE with aggregate signals price is independent on the
signal profile t, it turns out (Corollary 3.3.3) that the REE with aggregate signals is
coalitional Bayesian incentive compatible. Furthermore, the REE with aggregate signals
is interim efficient (Corollary 3.3.4).
Theorem 3.3.5. Suppose assumptions A1 – A5 and A7 hold, then there exists a REE
with aggregate signals in which the equilibrium price p is a constant.
Proof: This proof is similar to that of Theorem 3.3.2. We outline the argument first. In
Step 1, we consider a large deterministic economy E¯ . Applying the standard Walrasian
equilibrium existence results for large deterministic economies, we can obtain a Walrasian
equilibrium (y, p¯). In Step 2, we construct a price p and an allocation x from (y, p¯), and
show that (x, p) is a REE with equilibrium price being a constant.
Step 1: Define a mapping Γ from I × T to I × T 0 by letting Γ(i, t) = (i, ti) for all
(i, t) ∈ I × T . Γ is a measurable mapping.







for D ∈ I ⊗ T 0.
Since A4 holds, we can write the utility function as u(i, ·, t). For every (i, q) ∈ I×T 0,
define
V(i,q)(·) = E{u(i, ·, t)|t˜i = q}.
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We consider the deterministic economy E¯ = {(I × T 0, I ⊗ T 0, ν), V, e}. By the stan-
dard Walrasian equilibrium existence results (see Theorem 1.1.6, Chapter 1), there is a
Walrasian equilibrium for the economy E¯ . That is, there exists a price p¯ ∈ ∆m and an
allocation y of a measurable mapping from I × T 0 to Rm+ such that:
1. y is feasible, i.e.,
∫
I×T 0 y(i, ti)dν =
∫
I×T 0 e(i, ti)dν, and
2. for ν-almost all agent (i, q) ∈ I × T 0, y(i, q) is a maximal element in her budget
B(i,q)(p¯) = {z ∈ Rm+ : p¯z ≤ p¯e(i, q)}.2
Step 2: Let p(s, t, λf−1t ) = p¯ for P -almost all (s, t) ∈ S × T . It is a constant. We further
define
x(i, p, q, µ) =
 y(i, q) if p = p¯e(i, q) otherwise.
We will complete the proof by showing that x and p constitute a REE with aggregate
signals of the private information economy E .







for P T -almost all t ∈ T .
By the definition of x, x(i, p, ti, λf
−1
t ) = y(i, ti). Hence
∫
I






for P T -almost all t ∈ T .
Since P T is the marginal probability measure, it then follows that Equation (3.6)
must hold for P -almost (s, t) ∈ S × T . x is thus feasible. It is left to show that for
2By modifying the values of y on a null set (if necessary), we can assume that for every (i, q) ∈ I×T 0,
y(i, q) is a maximal element in her budget set.
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each agent i ∈ I, xi maximizes the conditional expected utility Ui subject to her budget
constraint.
Since the utility does not depend on macro state of nature and the price is constant,
the information conveyed in λf−1t will not affect agents’ estimation of utility. Hence
Ui(·|p, q, λf−1t ) = V(i,q)(·). (3.7)
Since agent i’s budget set is Bi(p, ti) = {z ∈ Rm+ : pz ≤ pe(i, ti)} when the signal
profile is t, Bi(p, ti) = B(i,ti)(p¯) for all t ∈ T . Combining this fact with Equation (3.7),
we know the following two problems are equivalent.
Problem (I)
max V (i, z, ti)





z | p, ti, λf−1t
)
s.t. z ∈ Bi(p, ti)
for all t ∈ T .
A similar argument as in the proof of Theorem 2.3.5, Chapter 2 shows that x(i, p, ti, λf
−1
t )
maximizes Ui(·|p, ti) subject to the budget set Bi(p, ti) for all (s, t) ∈ S × T .
Therefore, (x, p) constitutes a REE for the Private Information Economy E . Q.E.D.
We can easily obtain the following two lemmas.
Corollary 3.3.6. Any REE with aggregate signals in which the equilibrium price is a
constant must be coalitional Bayesian incentive compatible.
Corollary 3.3.7. Under the assumptions A1 – A4 and A7, there exists a REE with
aggregate signals which is coalitional Bayesian incentive compatible and interim efficient.
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3.4 Discussion
In a market, a shrewd agent will exhaust all efforts to obtain information before landing
a decision. We observe that macroeconomic statistics are as efficient as, and sometimes
more efficient than, commodity prices in transmitting information. One implication
in Radner’s REE model that is constantly being challenged is that agents not only
know commodity prices but also have to know the working of prices as a function.
This is far from being convincing since it is not clear so far how it is achieved by the
mechanism of market alone and which extra cost it incurs to obtain the price function on
the agents’ side. On the other hand, we notice that macroeconomic statistics are much
easier and less costly to get. We argue that if we allow agents to use the price function in
their decision making as in the REE model; why not let them use those macroeconomic
statistics? In light of this, we introduce the empirical signal distribution (which is a
statistic for private information signals) into the REE model, in the hope that this
additional piece of information will give agents a more accurate estimation of their utility
and which in turn leads to a more sensible decision. In the new model, an agent has three
sources of information: private information signal, information transmitted in prices and
information contained in the empirical signal distribution. The new equilibrium is called
REE with aggregate signals. Our results show that the information communicated in
the empirical signal distribution is favorable. Under certain assumptions, it leads to the
revelation of the real macro state of nature (but not the signal profile which is another
source of uncertainty). This enables us to get similar results as we did in Chapter
2. In Theorem 3.3.2, we obtain a REE with aggregate signals that has a state-wise
price. And in Theorem 3.3.5, the equilibrium price is a constant. However, compared to
REE in Chapter 2, here our assumptions on the utility function are less restrictive. In
fact, in Theorem 3.3.2 we only impose the standard assumptions on the utility function,
i.e., continuity and strict monotonicity. While in Theorem 3.3.5, the utility function is
required to be independent of the macro state of nature. However, this assumption does
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not exclude uncertainty about the utility since it still depends on the signal profile of all
agents.
Our extension of Radner’s REE model is different from the majority of the work in the
literature since none of their models take into account the empirical signal distribution
in agents’ expected utility. Nevertheless, we argue that our approach is in spirit a hybrid
of the classical REE model (see [45]) and the strategic foundation approach of REE (see
for example [6], [13] and [46]). The relationship between our model and the classical
REE model is evident. In the strategic foundation approach of REE, trading takes
place in several periods. Agents learn from the past about the reality. Eventually,
their knowledge evolves to the truth. In essence, agents in their model use empirical
information to facilitate their decision making. It is in this sense that our model is
similar to theirs.
Further research can be done in several directions. Firstly, a more solid and theoret-
ical foundation should be developed to deal with the information revelation by empirical
signal distribution. As the reader may have noticed, in our proofs we implicate that
the empirical signal distribution only reveals the information about the macro state of
nature, but nothing about the signal profile. This reasoning is ad hoc and weak since the
empirical signal distribution is based on signal profiles. Hence, a theoretical foundation
to cope with this issue will be of importance. Secondly, we mentioned without further
argument that our model can be interpreted in terms of Forges’ self-fulfilling mechanism
(see [23]). We think that a research based on our model and Forges’ self-fulfilling should
be interesting and enlightening. Thirdly, agents in our model access the macroeconomic
statistic for free. In reality, however, such information may not be totally free of charge.
For example, the cost for compiling macroeconomic statistics such as GDP and CPI
is usually burdened on tax payers. Some literature have been devoted to this topic.
For example, Krebs [34] considers costly information acquisition in private information
economy. Hence, similar work for our model can also be done for future research.
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In conclusion, in this chapter we formulate a new model in which agents have a new
source of information, i.e., empirical signal distribution, compared to the classical REE
model. We have shown for the new model the existence of equilibrium, efficiency and
coalitional Bayesian incentive compatibility. Our work is new in the literature and future
work in this direction may lead to some interesting and meaningful results.

Chapter4
Radner Equilibrium, Private Core and
Insurance Equilibrium in Private
Information Economy
4.1 Introduction
For the Private Information Economy (PIE) model introduced in Chapter 1, various
concepts of solution have been put forward that are similar to the standard notions in
deterministic economy such as Walrasian equilibrium and core (see [44], [57], [58], [36],
[37] and [49]). In this chapter, we discuss three of them (namely, Radner equilibrium,
private core and insurance equilibrium) and show the equivalence among these concepts.
Radner [44] introduced Radner equilibrium (also known as Walrasian expectations
equilibrium) as an extension of the classic Walrasian equilibrium for the private informa-
tion economy model. In a Radner equilibrium, commodity prices vary over the states of
nature. Each agent makes a state contingent consumption plan to maximize her expected
utility, subject to her interim budget set.
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While Radner’s notion of equilibrium has been widely accepted in the literature, the
situation is more complicated with the definition of core. The complication is mainly
due to the fact that in a PIE, members of a coalition may exchange information for their
good. Various definitions of core for the PIE have thus been proposed depending on the
amount of information to be shared in making coalitional contracts. For example, Wilson
[57] (see also [33]) introduced the coarse core with a minimal use of information that is
common to all coalition members. Yannelis [58] formulated a new concept of private
core in which each agent uses, and is limited to, their own private information. Since a
private core is also a coarse core, the existence of Wilson’s coarse core is a byproduct of
Theorem 3.1 in [58]. It is Yannelis’ definition of core, i.e., private core, that we will be
using in this chapter.
Another notion of equilibrium that also deserves some attention is the so-called in-
surance equilibrium. This notion of equilibrium is used to study insurance systems where
each agent takes on individual risks and makes choices of consumption to spread risks
across states of nature. In the insurance equilibrium model, agents can transfer income
from one state to another through insurance against mishaps in the future. Therefore,
in the model, an agent’s budget set is not limited to the income in each state. This
model was studied by Manilvaud in [36] and [37]. Sun [49] further investigated the issue
of insurability in a large game and obtained a striking result: in a large game, individual
risks are insurable if and only if they are essentially pairwise independent.
As we have seen in Chapter 1 that although these concepts are defined from different
perspectives, they may coincide with each other under certain assumptions in a deter-
ministic economy. This chapter will embark on the task to examine the above-mentioned
concepts and show that they indeed coincide in the context of private information econ-
omy.
This chapter is organized as follows: in section 4.2 we introduce a variant of private
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information economy model and its induced large deterministic economy model; in sec-
tion 4.3 we define Radner equilibrium, private core and insurance equilibrium; in section
4.4 we cover basic assumptions and present all main results and their proofs; in section
4.5 we conclude this chapter with a discussion on the related work in the literature.
This chapter is based on my joint paper [51] with Professor Yeneng Sun and Professor
Nicholas C. Yannelis.
4.2 Economic models
In Chapter 1 we introduced a framework to model uncertainty and private information in
an economy. Based upon this framework, a model for private information economy was
established. In this chapter, we continue to use the framework and economic model with
a few changes in place. The reader may consult the relevant parts in previous chapters
for a refresh of memory on those concepts and notations.
4.2.1 Private information economy
In the following, we highlight the changes for the private information economy model
that are specific for this chapter.
In a PIE model, an agent is informed of a private information signal induced from
an exogenous signal process f . Unlike the previous chapters, in the chapter we define
the signal process f to be a mapping from I × Ω to T 0 as f(i, ω) = ti. Since Ω is the
product of macro state space S and signal profile space T , f(i, ω) can also be written as
f(i, s, t) where ω = (s, t). The reason for such a change is that in this chapter our focus
is not on the source of uncertainty. Be it macro state of nature or signal profile, we treat
them in the same manner. To avoid verbosity, we often refer to ω ∈ Ω as a state which
should nevertheless be distinguished from macro state of nature defined in Chapter 1.
For each agent i ∈ I, we can define a probability distribution pii of agent i’s private
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information signal distribution. For q ∈ T 0, pii({q}) = Pf−1i ({q}) is the probability of
agent i receiving a private information signal q. pii({q}) is often abbreviated as pii(q) for
notational simplicity.
Let Ti = {q ∈ T 0 : pii(q) > 0} be the set of all private information signals that
matter to agent i (in the probabilistic sense). Since T 0 is finite, the agent space can
be partitioned into a finite number of disjoint sets I1, . . . , Ih such that all agents in
Ij , 1 ≤ j ≤ h, have the same set of Ti. That is, i1, i2 ∈ Ij for some 1 ≤ j ≤ h if and
only if Ti1 = Ti2 . Thus, we can use TIj , 1 ≤ j ≤ h to denote the common set of Ti for
all agents i ∈ Ij . Fix q ∈ T 0, note that pii(q) =
∫
Ω 1f−1({q})(i, ω)dP , hence pii(q) is a
measurable function if viewed as a function on I. Since
Ij =
(




∩q /∈TIj {i ∈ I : pii(q) = 0}
)
Ij is measurable for all 1 ≤ j ≤ h. We assume that λ(Ij) > 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ h.
Agents are characterized by a consumption set, a random utility function and a
random initial endowment. Throughout this chapter, we assume that the randomness
of agents’ utility arises from private information signal. In other words, we assume that
each agent’s utility function depends only on her own private information signal and
consumption. Hence, the utility function u can be viewed as a mapping from I × Rm+ ×
T 0 to R+. For x ∈ Rm+ , q ∈ T 0, u(i, x, q) is the utility of agent i when her private
information signal is q and consumes x. In this sense, private information signal can also
be understood to be the state that an agent may find herself in. Except for the utility
function, all other characteristics of an agent remain the same as in Chapter 1.
The private information economy is collectively denoted by
E = {(I × Ω, I  F , λ P ), u, e, (t˜i, i ∈ I), s˜} .
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4.2.2 Induced large deterministic economy
From the private information economy E , we can construct an auxiliary large determin-
istic economy E¯ (see [49], [36]). This large deterministic economy will be handy in the
proofs of our results, we describe it here.












That means Ei(z) is equal to the expectation of x. For this reason, Ei(x) will also be
used to denote the expectation of x on the probability measure space (T 0, T 0, pii).
For any x ∈ Rm+ , we define the following set
E−1i (x) = {z ∈ (Rm+ )Ti | Ei(z) = x}.
The utility function v of the economy E¯ is defined as
v(i, x) = max{
∑
q∈Ti
pii(q)ui(z(q), q) : z ∈ E−1i (x)},
for agent i with consumption x.
The following lemma shows that v indeed defines a utility function.
Lemma 4.2.1. For each i ∈ I, vi is well-defined and continuous. Furthermore, if ui is
(strictly) monotone, then vi is (strictly) monotone.
Before we proceed to the proof, we would like to point out that Sun [49] (Lemma
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3.2) has proven this lemma for the case of complete and continuous preference. Since
preference and utility function are equivalent under those assumptions (see [15]), as a
consequence, this lemma holds. However, we provide an alternative proof below which
deals directly with utility function.
Proof: This proof will be completed in four steps.
Step I: In this step, we prove that vi is well-defined.





where z ∈ (Rm+ )Ti .
Since u(i, ·, q) is assumed to be continuous for each q ∈ T 0, Vi is continuous. By
definition,
vi(x) = max{Vi(z) : z ∈ E−1i (x)}.
It is clear that for each x ∈ Rm+ , E−1i (x) is non-empty. Since pii(q) > 0 for any q ∈ Ti,
E−1i (x) is compact. Hence, Vi attains maximum on E
−1
i (x). Thus, vi is well-defined.
Step II: Let pimin = min{pii(q) : q ∈ Ti}. Then pimin > 0. Let x = (x1, . . . , xm) and
y = (y1, . . . , ym) be points in Rm+ . In this step we will prove that for any z ∈ E−1i (x),




, where |Ti| denotes the cardinality
of the set Ti and || · || is the 2-norm on Euclidean space.





if xk 6= 0
yk
pii(q)|Ti| if xk = 0.
where q ∈ Ti and k = 1, . . . ,m.
It is easy to check that Ei(z
′) = y, i.e., z′ ∈ E−1i (y).
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Note that when xk = 0, z(q, k) = 0 for all q ∈ Ti, thus we have




if xk 6= 0
yk
pii(q)|Ti| if xk = 0.














|z(q, k)yk − xk
xk
| ≤ |yk − xk|
pii(q)
≤ |yk − xk|
pimin
. (4.1)







≤ |yk − xk|
pimin
. (4.2)
From Equation (4.1) and (4.2), we have
|z′(q, k)− z(q, k)| ≤ |yk − xk|
pimin
for all q ∈ Ti and k = 1, . . . ,m.
It follows immediately that









Step III: Now we are ready to prove the continuity of vi. Let x ∈ Rm+ , we shall prove
that for any ε > 0, there exists δ > 0 such that
|vi(x)− vi(y)| < ε
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for any y ∈ Rm+ with ||x− y|| < δ.
Let d = max{||z|| : z ∈ E−1i (x)}. d is well-defined since E−1i (x) is a compact set
(see Step I). Let B be the spheroid centered at the origin with a radius d + 1, i.e.,
B = {z ∈ (Rm+ )Ti : ||z|| ≤ d + 1}. B is also compact (being both bounded and closed
in (Rm+ )Ti) and E−1i (x) ⊂ B. Since Vi is continuous, Vi is uniformly continuous on B.
Hence, for any ε > 0, there exists δ1 > 0 (w.l.o.g., we assume δ1 < 1) such that
|Vi(z)− Vi(z′)| < ε (4.4)
for all z, z′ ∈ B with ||z − z′|| < δ1.




> 0. Let y ∈ Rm+ with ||x− y|| < δ. Take z to be a maximal element
of Vi in E
−1
i (x), i.e., Vi(z) = vi(x). By Step II, there is z
′ ∈ E−1i (y) such that Equation




< δ1. Furthermore, ||z′|| ≤ ||z||+ δ1 < d + 1.
Hence, z, z′ ∈ B and ||z − z′|| < δ1. It follows from Equation (4.4) that
|Vi(z)− Vi(z′)| < ε.
This implies
vi(x) = Vi(z) < Vi(z
′) + ε ≤ vi(y) + ε.
Equivalently,
vi(x) < vi(y) + ε, (4.5)
for all y with ||x− y|| < δ.
Note that the last paragraph of argument also applies with x and y being exchanged,
hence
vi(y) < vi(x) + ε, (4.6)
for all y with ||x− y|| < δ.
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Equation (4.5) and (4.6) implies the continuity of vi at x. Since x is arbitrary, vi is
continuous.
Step IV The (strict) monotonicity follows from the fact that Vi is (strictly) monotone
if ui is also (strictly) monotone and the fact that if x ≤ y, then for any z ∈ E−1i (x) there
is z′ ∈ E−1i (y) such that z ≤ z′. This completes the proof. Q.E.D.
Each agent i ∈ I in the large deterministic economy E¯ has an initial endowment
e¯(i) = Ei(e).
We summarize the induced large deterministic pure exchange economy as E¯ = {(I, I, λ), v, e¯}.
4.3 Radner equilibrium, private core and insurance equi-
librium
In this section, we will introduce the definitions for Radner equilibrium, private core and
insurance equilibrium and related concepts.
A price or price process is a measurable mapping from Ω to ∆m. For ω ∈ Ω, p(ω)
is the commodity prices when ω is selected by Mother Nature.
An allocation x is a measurable mapping from I ×Ω to Rm+ . For any (i, ω) ∈ I ×Ω,
x(i, ω) is interpreted as agent i’s consumption at ω. When agents’ consumption depends
only on their private information signals, we simply write it as x(i, q), where q ∈ T 0. In
this case, x is also viewed as a mapping from I × T 0 to Rm+ .
Let z be a mapping from Ω to Rm+ . For agent i ∈ I, suppose her consumption plan






When agent i’s consumption plan is contingent on private information signal, i.e., z
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ui(z(f(i, ω)), f(i, ω))dP =
∑
q∈T 0
pii(q)ui(z(q), q) = Eiui(z(q), q).
One particular feature of Radner’s definition of equilibrium is the possibility of wealth
transfer across states. Hence, agents are no longer constrained to their income at each
state as they do in the rational expectations equilibrium model. They may spend their
income in advance or save it up for the future. The only requirement is their expenditure
remains balanced across the states. Consequently, they are faced with a new type of
budget set. Given a price process p, agent i’s interim budget set is
Bi(p) =
{








Now, we state the definition of Radner equilibrium:
Definition 4.3.1. (Radner Equilibrium or Walrasian Expectations Equilib-
rium) Let E = {(I × Ω, I  F , λ P ), u, e, (t˜i, i ∈ I), s˜} be a private information econ-
omy. A Radner equilibrium is a pair of an allocation x∗ and a price p∗ such that
1. For each agent i ∈ I, x∗i depends on her private information signal only.
2. x∗ is feasible, i.e.,
∫
I x
∗(i, f(i, ω))dλ =
∫
I e(i, f(i, ω))dλ for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω.
3. For λ-almost all agent i ∈ I, x∗i is a maximizer of the following problem:
max Ui(z)
s.t. z ∈ Bi(p∗).
Condition (1) indicates that each agent’s consumption is contingent on her private
information signal.
Condition (2) is the standard market clearing condition.
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Condition (3) shows that each agent makes an ex ante plan of consumption for all
possible states the future may reveal to her and the plan maximizes her expected utility
subject to interim budget set.
Remark 4.3.2. Radner equilibrium is also known as Walrasian expectations equilibrium
in the literature.
Definition 4.3.3. An allocation x for the private information economy E is called a
Radner equilibrium allocation if there is a price p such that (x, p) form a Radner
equilibrium. The set of all Radner equilibrium allocations is denoted by RE(E).
The concept of private core was initiated by Yannelis in [58]. Before we formally
define it, we need the following definition:
Definition 4.3.4. Let x and y be two allocations for the private information economy
E, W be a coalition. y is said to block x on W if
1.
∫
W y(i, ω)dλ =
∫
W e(i, f(i, ω))dλ for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω.
2. Ui(yi) > Ui(xi) for λ-almost all i ∈W .
Remark 4.3.5. 1. When the allocation y depends only on agents’ private information
signal, Condition (1) becomes
1’
∫
W y(i, f(i, ω))dλ =
∫
W e(i, f(i, ω))dλ for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω.
2. If u is strictly monotone, Condition (2) is equivalent to:
2’ Ui(yi) ≥ Ui(xi) for λ-almost all i ∈W and λ({i ∈W : Ui(yi) > Ui(xi)}) > 0.
We give the definition of private core below:
Definition 4.3.6. (Private Core) Let E = {(I × Ω, I  F , λ P ), u, e, (t˜i, i ∈ I), s˜}
be a private information economy. The private core of E is the set of all allocations x
such that
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1. For all i ∈ I, xi depends only on agent i’s private information signal.
2. x is feasible, i.e.,
∫
I x(i, f(i, ω))dλ =
∫
I e(i, f(i, ω))dλ for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω.
3. There is no coalition W and no allocation y which depends only on private infor-
mation signal such that y blocks x on W .
We denote the private core as PC(E).
In the definition of private core, we notice that there is no information sharing among
agents in a coalition. Each agent uses only their own private information signal in making
consumption plan. For the philosophy behind this definition, we quote Yannelis [58] ”...
since in most applications, agents do not have an incentive to reveal their own private
information (think of situations of moral hazard or adverse selection).”
The third concept of solution we will encounter is called insurance equilibrium. When
there are a large number of risk bearing agents in a market and no collective risk prevails,
it is often conjectured that contingent commodity prices are the multiple of ”sure prices”
and an objective probability (see [36] and [37]). To justify it, as shown in [29], one can
alter the standard state-wise market clearing condition for economy with uncertainty by
equating the aggregate expected demand to the aggregate expected supply (in the case
when no production takes place, the aggregate supply is equal to the aggregate initial
endowments). The exact law of large numbers (which requires a large number of agents
and some kind of independence between them) indicates that market clearing condition is
also satisfied state-wise. Since this model is often used for the study of insurance system
(see [36] and [49]), we call the corresponding equilibrium concept insurance equilibrium.
It should be reminded, however, that there is no standard name for the equilibrium of
this model in the literature. We define insurance equilibrium below:
Definition 4.3.7. (Insurance Equilibrium) Let E = {(I × Ω, I  F , λ P ), u, e, (t˜i, i ∈ I), s˜}
be a private information economy. An insurance equilibrium is a pair of an allocation x∗
and a price p∗ such that
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1. The price p∗ is constant, i.e., p∗(ω) = p∗(ω′) for all ω, ω′ ∈ Ω.
2. For each agent i ∈ I, x∗i depends only on her private information signal.
3. The allocation x∗ is feasible in the sense that
∫
I x
∗(i, f(i, ω))dλ =
∫
I e(i, f(i, ω))dλ.
4. For λ-almost all agent i ∈ I, x∗i is a maximizer of the following problem:
max Ui(z)
s.t. z ∈ Bi(p∗).
Condition (1) shows that the price in equilibrium is a ”sure price” in that it does not
depend on ω.
Condition (2) indicates that each agent’s consumption is contingent on her private
information.
Condition (3) is the market clearing condition.
Condition (4) requires that each agent act to maximize their expected utility subject
to the constraint of interim budget set. When price is constant, we notice that the
interim budget set becomes
Bi(p) =
{









Hence agent i chooses a contingent plan of consumption whose expected value does not
exceed the value of expected initial endowment.
Definition 4.3.8. An allocation x for the private information economy E is called an in-
surance equilibrium allocation if there is a price p such that (x, p) form an insurance
equilibrium. The set of all insurance equilibrium allocations is denoted by IE(E).
By now, we have defined three concepts of solution for the private information econ-
omy. The next section will show the equivalence among them under quite conventional
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assumptions.
4.4 Assumptions and results
4.4.1 Assumptions
We make the following assumptions for all the lemmas and theorems.
A1 For P -almost all ω ∈ Ω, ∫I e(i, f(i, ω))dλ 0.
A2 For P -almost all ω ∈ Ω, ∫I e(i, f(i, ω))dλ∞.
A3 For any fixed i ∈ I, q ∈ T 0, the utility function u(i, ·, q) is continuous and strictly
monotone.
A4 For any fixed i ∈ I, q ∈ T 0, the utility function u(i, ·, q) is concave.
A5 The signal process f is essentially pairwise independent in the sense that for λ-almost
all i ∈ I, it holds that: fi and fj are independent for λ-almost all j ∈ I.
4.4.2 Results
Lemma 4.4.1. Let E be a private information economy and E¯ be the induced large
deterministic economy. Suppose y is an allocation for E¯. Then there exists an allocation
x for E with the following properties:
1. For each i ∈ I, xi depends only on agent i’s private information signal.
2. For λ-almost all i ∈ I, yi = Ei(xi).
3. For λ-almost all i ∈ I, vi(yi) = Ui(xi).
4. For any A ∈ I, if ∫A y(i)dλ = ∫A e¯(i)dλ, then ∫A x(i, f(i, ω))dλ = ∫A e(i, f(i, ω))dλ
for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω. In particular, if y is feasible in E¯, then x is feasible in E.
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This lemma follows from the proof of Lemma 3.2 in [49]. We sketch the idea of the
proof. The reader can refer to [49] for details.
Proof For each i ∈ I, we can define C(i) = {z ∈ E−1i (yi) : Vi(z) = vi(yi)}, i.e., C(i) is
the set of all maximal elements of Vi in E
−1
i (yi). Then it can be proven that C(i) is a
compact-valued measurable correspondence (see the proof of Lemma 3.2 in [49]). Hence,
we can make a measurable selection x such that xi ∈ C(i). It is easy to check that x is
the desired allocation. Q.E.D.
Let E be a private information economy and E¯ be the induced large deterministic
economy. Denote the core of E¯ by C(E¯). The following lemma shows that PC(E) = C(E¯)
in some sense.
Lemma 4.4.2. 1. Suppose x ∈ PC(E). Define an allocation y for the economy E¯
such that y(i) = Ei(xi) for each i ∈ I. Then y ∈ C(E¯).
2. Suppose y ∈ C(E¯), then there exists x ∈ PC(E) such that yi = Ei(xi) and vi(yi) =
Ui(xi) for λ-almost all i ∈ I.
Proof
1) By definition, to prove y ∈ C(E¯), we need to show that





(ii) there is no coalition W and no feasible allocation z such that z blocks y on W .
Since x is feasible, the following equality holds for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω
∫
I
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Hence, y is feasible. Part (i) has thus been proven.
For part (ii), we prove it by contradiction.
Suppose y is not a core allocation for the economy E¯ , then there exists a coalition W




W e¯(i)dλ and b) vi(zi) > vi(yi) for
λ-almost all i ∈W .
By Lemma 4.4.1, there exists a feasible allocation a for the economy E such that
1. ai depends only on private information signal.
2. zi = Ei(ai) for λ-almost all i ∈ I.
3. vi(zi) = Ui(ai) for λ-almost all i ∈ I.
Hence a satisfies the first two conditions in the definition of private core (see Definition





S e¯(i)dλ, Lemma 4.4.1 also indicates that
∫
S
a(i, f(i, ω))dλ =
∫
S
e(i, f(i, ω))dλ (4.7)
for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω.
Note that for each i ∈ I, xi ∈ E−1i (yi), hence vi(yi) ≥ Ui(xi). Since vi(zi) > vi(yi)
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for λ-almost all i ∈W and vi(zi) = Ui(ai), we have
Ui(ai) > Ui(xi)
for λ-almost all i ∈W .
It follows that a blocks x on W , contradicting the fact that x is a private core
allocation. In other words, there is no coalition and no feasible allocation blocks y. Part
(ii) is thus proven.
From part (i) and (ii), we know y must be a core allocation for E¯ . This completes
our proof of the first statement in the lemma.
2) Let y ∈ C(E¯), by applying Lemma 4.4.1, we have an allocation x for the economy E
such that
1. For each i ∈ I, xi depends only on private information signal.
2. y(i) = Ei(xi) for λ-almost all i ∈ I.
3. vi(yi) = Ui(xi) for λ-almost all i ∈ I.
4. Since y is feasible for the economy E¯ , x is feasible for the economy E .
We shall show that x ∈ C(E).




W a(i, f(i, ω))dλ =
∫
W e(i, f(i, ω))dλ for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω.
(ii) Ui(ai) > Ui(xi) for λ-almost all i ∈W .
Define an allocation z for the economy E¯ by letting z(i) = Ei(ai). It is easy to verify
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Since vi(zi) ≥ Ui(ai) by the definition of vi and vi(yi) = Ui(xi), property (ii) above
implies that vi(zi) > vi(yi) for λ-almost all i ∈ S. That means z blocks y on S, contradict.
Hence, x ∈ C(E). Q.E.D.
Lemma 4.4.2 shows that a private core allocation of the economy E can be mapped
naturally to a core allocation of the induced deterministic economy E¯ by taking the
expectation of the private core allocation. Conversely, for a core allocation of E¯ , there
exists a private core allocation of E whose expectation is the core allocation. Furthermore,
each agent has the same level of utility (expected utility for agents in E) in the two
economies with these two allocations. Hence, PC(E) = C(E¯) in a sense. The following
theorem further shows that RE(E) = PC(E).
Theorem 4.4.3. Let E be a private information economy.
1. If (x∗, p∗) is an insurance equilibrium for E, then x∗ is a private core allocation.
2. If x∗ is a private core allocation of E, then there exists a price p∗ such that (x∗, p∗)
is an insurance equilibrium.
Proof
1) We prove by contradiction.
Suppose x∗ is not a private core allocation, then there exist a coalition W and a
feasible allocation a such that
1.
∫
W a(i, f(i, ω))dλ =
∫
W e(i, f(i, ω))dλ for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω.
2. Ui(ai) > Ui(x
∗
i ) for λ-almost all i ∈W .
Since x∗i is a maximizer of the following problem
max Ui(z)
s.t. z ∈ Bi(p∗).
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ai /∈ Bi(p∗) for λ-almost all i ∈W . In other words,
p∗Ei(ai) > p∗Ei(ei) for λ-almost all i ∈W.

























Under the assumption A5, the exact law of large numbers implies the following two





















for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω.
On the other hand,
∫
W
a(i, f(i, ω))dλ =
∫
W
e(i, f(i, ω))dλ for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω
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a(i, f(i, ω))dλ = p∗
∫
W
e(i, f(i, ω))dλ for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω,
contradict.
Hence, x∗ must be a private core allocation. This completes the proof for the first
statement.
2) Suppose x∗ is a private core allocation for the economy E . We shall find a price p∗
such that (x∗, p∗) is an insurance equilibrium.
By Lemma 4.4.2, we can construct a core allocation y∗ for the deterministic economy
E¯ by letting y∗i = Ei(x∗i ). The standard Core Equivalence Theorem (see Theorem 1.1.10,
Chapter 1) indicates there is a price p∗ such that (y∗, p∗) is a Walrasian equilibrium
for the economy E¯ . That is, y∗ is a feasible allocation and y∗i maximizes the following
problem
max vi(z)
s.t. p∗z ≤ p∗e¯(i).
We want to show that (x∗, p∗) is an insurance equilibrium for E . Since x∗ is a private
core allocation, it is easy to check that (x∗, p∗) satisfy the first three conditions in the
definition of insurance equilibrium (see Definition 4.3.7). It is left to show that for λ-
almost all i ∈ I, x∗i maximizes agent i’s expected utility Ui(·) subject to her interim
budget set Bi(p
∗).
To prove this, we first show that vi(y
∗
i ) = Ui(x
∗
i ) for λ-almost all i ∈ I. By Lemma
4.4.1, there exists a feasible allocation a such that i)Ui(ai) = vi(y
∗
i ) and ii)y
∗
i = Ei(ai)
for λ-almost all i ∈ I. Since vi(y∗i ) ≥ Ui(x∗i ), we have Ui(ai) ≥ Ui(x∗i ) for λ-almost all
i ∈ I. If Ui(ai) > Ui(x∗i ) on a set of agents with positive measure, then x∗ is blocked by
a, contradicting the fact that x∗ is a private core allocation. Hence, Ui(ai) = Ui(x∗i ) for
λ-almost all i ∈ I, which in turns implies vi(y∗i ) = Ui(x∗i ) for λ-almost all i ∈ I.
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Since for any z ∈ Bi(p∗), p∗Ei(z) ≤ p∗e¯(i), and since y∗i is a maximal element, we
have vi(Ei(z)) ≤ vi(y∗i ). But vi(Ei(z)) ≥ Ui(z), it follows immediately that Ui(x∗i ) =
vi(y
∗
i ) ≥ Ui(z). That is to say that x∗i maximizes Ui(·) subject to the interim budget set
Bi(p
∗). Hence, (x∗, p∗) is an insurance equilibrium for E . Q.E.D.
Theorem 4.4.3 indicates that an insurance equilibrium allocation is a private core.
The converse is also true. For a private core allocation, we can find a price to form an
insurance equilibrium. Therefore, insurance equilibrium and private core coincide in the
private information economy E , i.e., PC(E) = IC(E).
Lemma 4.4.4. An insurance equilibrium is a Radner equilibrium.
Proof It follows directly from the definitions. Q.E.D.
Theorem 4.4.5. Let E be a private information economy.
1. If (x∗, p∗) is a Radner equilibrium for E, then x∗ is a private core allocation.
2. If x∗ is a private core allocation of E, then there exists a price p∗ such that (x∗, p∗)
is a Radner equilibrium.
Proof
1) As in the proof of Theorem 4.4.3, we prove by contradiction.
Suppose x∗ is not a private core, then there exist a coalition W and a feasible allo-
cation a such that
1.
∫
W a(i, f(i, ω))dλ =
∫
W e(i, f(i, ω))dλ for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω.
2. Ui(ai) > Ui(x
∗
i ) for λ-almost all i ∈W .
Since Ui(ai) > Ui(x
∗
i ) and x
∗
i maximizes Ui(·) subject to the interim budget Bi(p∗),
ai /∈ Bi(x∗i ) for λ-almost all i ∈W . It follows that
∫
Ω
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for λ-almost all i ∈ S.











Since assumption A5 holds, the above inequality implies
∫
W




for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω.
On the other hand,
∫
W a(i, f(i, ω))dλ =
∫
W e(i, f(i, ω))dλ for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω
implies ∫
W




for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω, contradict.
Hence, x∗ must be a private core allocation.
2) This part follows directly from Theorem 4.4.3 and Lemma 4.4.4. Q.E.D.
Theorem 4.4.5 indicates that a Radner equilibrium allocation is a private core. The
fact that the converse is also true follows from Theorem 4.4.3 and Lemma 4.4.4. For a
private core allocation, we can find a price to form an insurance equilibrium. Since an
insurance equilibrium is a Radner equilibrium, a private core can be supported by a price
to form a Radner equilibrium. Therefore, private core and Radner equilibrium coincide
in the private information economy E , i.e., PC(E) = RE(E).
Theorem 4.4.3 and Theorem 4.4.5 indicate that the concepts of Radner equilibrium,
insurance equilibrium and private core coincide in the private information economy when
agents have essentially pairwise independent private information signals. This is sum-
marized in the following theorem:
4.5 Discussion 93
Theorem 4.4.6. Radner equilibrium, insurance equilibrium and private core coincide in
the private information economy E in the sense that IE(E) = RE(E) = PC(E).
4.5 Discussion
The study of the equivalence between core and competitive equilibrium first appeared
in Edgeworth [17]. In the book Edgeworth showed, in a very special setup, that core
collapsed to the set of competitive equilibria as the number of agents in an economy
gets large. He continued to conjecture that this equivalence relationship should hold for
a general economy. Inspired by his work, many efforts have been devoted to the study
the relationship between core and competitive equilibrium. Edgeworth’s conjecture was
first proven by Debreu and Scarf in [16]. Anderson [4] provided a Core Equivalence
Theorem with the help of Shapley-Folkman Theorem. Following a argument similar to
Anderson’s, Aumann [8] obtained the same result for large economies using Lyapunov
Theorem. Anderson [5] is a good reference for a comprehensive survey on core equivalence
theorems.
The situation becomes a bit more complicated when it comes to private information
economy model. There exist different versions of definitions for equilibrium and core. In
this chapter, we investigate the relationship among private core, Radner equilibrium and
insurance equilibrium. We show that these three concepts coincide in a large economy
with private information provided that agents’ private information signals are essentially
pairwise independent.
The work in the literature that is closely related to ours is [21]. Our work differs from
theirs mainly in two aspects. In their paper, Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz establish the
existence of Radner equilibrium for ”irreducible” large economy with private information.
An economy is ”irreducible” if a coalition can always improve its welfare with another
coalition’s initial endowments. Einy et. al. further show that Radner equilibrium and
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private core coincided in an ”irreducible” economy. While in our work, we do not impose
the ”irreducibility” assumption on the private information economy. Furthermore, in
their paper private information is modeled by partitions of the macro state space for
each agent. On the other hand, we use a signal process and private information signals
to model private information. This allows us to consider the informational negligibility
of an individual agent. When the signal process is essentially pairwise independent,
the exact law of large numbers indicates that each agent has negligible information.
However, this is not so clear with their model although they also consider an economy
with a continuum of agents.
Sun and Yannelis [52] have also proven the core equivalence theorem for a large
private information economy. However, it is worth pointing out that the equilibrium and
core in their paper are defined in an ex ante sense. In particular, equilibrium allocation
and core depend on the aggregate signals. Private information plays its role in the study
of incentive compatibility. On the other hand, in our definitions an allocation depends
only on agents’ private information signals. Hence, the concepts of equilibrium and core
in these two work are different.
In addition, we have also shown the equivalence between private core and insurance
equilibrium. As a consequence, insurance equilibrium and Radner equilibrium coincide
with each other. Therefore, when agents have negligible influence in a large private
information economy, private core, Radner equilibrium and insurance core coincide.
Chapter5
Bargaining Set and Walrasian
Equilibrium in Private Information
Economy
5.1 Introduction
In Chapter 1 we discussed bargaining set for deterministic economies. This chapter
explores the issue further in the setup of a private information economy.
The notion of bargaining set introduced by Aumann and Maschler [10] is a refinement
to the concept of core. In the definition of core, an allocation is considered to be unstable
(and thus is not a reasonable solution to the model) if some coalition can threaten to quit
the grand coalition and improve its members’ welfare by redistributing initial resources
among themselves. An allocation is in the core if no such threat exists. Many authors
(see for example, Aumann and Maschler [10], Mas-Colell [40]) argue that this reasoning
is faulty since it does not consider the validity of threats. As the example in [10] shows
that such a threat may be futile if it triggers threat from other coalitions. This leads
95
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to the notion of bargaining set in which all unjustified (in the sense to be made precise
later) threats are expurgated. In general, bargaining set is bigger than the core for it is
more difficult to raise a threat in the context of bargaining set. In fact, core may fail to
exist in many situations while bargaining set is always non-empty (see Maschler [41]).
In the preceding chapters, we learned that various concepts of solutions for an eco-
nomic model might coincide with each other under some conditions. For example, Theo-
rem 1.1.10 of Chapter 1 shows that core coincides with Walrasian equilibrium in a large
deterministic economy. Mas-Colell [40] (see Theorem 1.1.16, Chapter 1) establishes the
equivalence between bargaining set and core for deterministic economies with a contin-
uum of agents. Therefore, it follows that Walrasian equilibrium, core and bargaining
set are essentially the same in a large deterministic economy. It is interesting to know
whether the same equivalence relationship continues to hold in the case of a private
information economy. The situation is more complicated for the presence of various vari-
ants of each concept for the private information economy model. For instance, as we
discussed in Chapter 4, there are several variations for the definition of core. In spite
of the complexity arising from the diversifying definitions, some positive results have
been obtained in the literature. Einy et. al. [20] shows that the private bargaining set
agrees with Radner competitive equilibrium in a private information economy. Sun and
Yannelis [52] show that ex ante core coincides with ex ante Walrasian equilibrium. It is
our aim in this chapter to prove the equivalence between bargaining set and Walrasian
equilibrium in a private information economy. Combining it with the result from Sun
and Yannelis [52] , we can conclude that in a private information economy, bargaining
set, core and Walrasian equilibrium coincide in the ex ante sense.
This chapter is organized as follows: in section 5.2 we introduce a variant of private
information economy model and a corresponding state contingent economy model; in
section 5.3 we define bargaining set and Walrasian equilibrium; in section 5.4 we cover
basic assumptions and present all main results and their proofs; in section 5.5 we conclude
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this chapter with a discussion on the related work in the literature.
5.2 Economic models
In this chapter we will use the private information economy model introduced in [52].
This model is analogous to the private information economy model we established in
Chapter 1. Hence, we will not discuss every detail of the model but emphasize only
the differences and changes. The reader can refer to Chapter 1 for a comprehensive
description of the model.
5.2.1 Private information economy
We recall that a private information economy consists of an underlying framework for
the modeling of uncertainty, an agent space and a commodity space. Each agent is
characterized by a consumption set, a random utility and a random initial endowment.
In this chapter, we assume that the only source of uncertainty affecting an agent’s
utility is the macro state of nature. Therefore the utility function u is a measurable
mapping from I × Rm+ × S to R+. For each i ∈ I, x ∈ Rm+ and s ∈ S, u(i, x, s) is agent
i’s utility when the macro state of nature is s and her consumption is x.
We also assume that there is no randomness in the initial endowment. An agent’s
initial endowment does not vary across macro states of nature or signal profiles. As such,
the collective initial endowment can be regarded as a mapping from I to Rm+ . For each
i ∈ I, e(i) is agent i’s initial endowment. We may think that the initial endowment for
each agent has been arranged before the market starts. Hence, it does not change as the
market moves along.
Except for the utility function and initial endowments, all other components of a pri-
vate information economy remain the same as in the model of Chapter 1. It is collectively
denoted by E = {(I × Ω, I  F , λ P ), u, e, (t˜i, i ∈ I), s˜}.
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5.2.2 State contingent economy
As shown in [15] and [52], when agents’ utility depends only on macro state of nature,
it is often profitable to consider a state contingent economy in which a same commodity
is treated differently in two distinct macro states of nature. In this way, the original
economy reduces to a deterministic economy with an enlarged commodity space. All
relevant results for deterministic economies can then be applied to the new economy.
Sun and Yannelis [52] have done a thorough research for the private information economy
E and its state contingent economy. We rely on their results in this chapter. For this
reason, we will describe the state contingent economy at length in this section.
Before we proceed, it may be a good time for us to pause for a while and discuss
the notational convention that we will adopt throughout the rest of this chapter. We
keep aligned with Sun and Yannelis’ notational convention in [52]. The state contingent
economy will be denoted by Epi. When confusion may arise, we use the superscript p
for the private information economy E and pi for the state contingent economy. For
example, an allocation for the private information economy may be denoted by xp and
an allocation for the state contingent economy may then be denoted by xpi.
For a private information economy, we can define a state contingent economy which is
a deterministic economy. In the following, we cover the essential elements of the economy
including agent space, commodity space and agent’s characteristics.
Agent space (I, I, λ), λ(I) = 1, the agent space remains the same.
Commodity Space As mentioned above, a same commodity is regarded as different
in two distinct macro states of nature. Therefore, the commodity space becomes
(Rm)S . For a commodity bundle x ∈ (Rm)S , we use x(j, s) to denote the quantity
of the j-th commodity at the macro state of nature s ∈ S. For each s ∈ S, the
notation x(s) refers to the m-dimensional vector (x(1, s), . . . , x(m, s)).
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Agent’s Characteristics Each agent i ∈ I has the following characteristics:
Consumption Set Each agent has a consumption set Xi = (Rm+ )S .
Utility Function For each agent i ∈ I, if her consumption is z, then she has a
utility of
∑
s∈S ui(z(s), s)pis. Therefore, the collective utility function u
pi is
a measurable mapping from I × (Rm+ )S to R+. For each i ∈ I, z ∈ (Rm+ )S ,
upii (z) =
∑
s∈S ui(z(s), s)pis. It is clear that u
pi
i can be interpreted as the
expected utility of agent i given her consumption z(s) for each macro state of
nature s ∈ S.
Initial Endowment Since we assume that an agent’s initial endowment is irrel-
evant to the underlying uncertainty, agent i in the state contingent economy
has an initial endowment epi(i) = (e(i), . . . , e(i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
K
), where K is the number of
macro states of nature.
The state contingent economy Epi is summarized as:
Definition 5.2.1. (State Contingent Economy) Let E = {(I × Ω, I  F , λ P ), u, e, (t˜i, i ∈ I), s˜}
be a private information economy. The corresponding state contingent economy Epi con-
sists of
1. an atomless measure space of agent (I, I, λ),
2. a commodity space (Rm)S,
3. for each agent i ∈ I,
• a consumption set Xi,
• a utility function upii ,
• an initial endowment epi(i).
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Since the state contingent economy is a deterministic economy, all the concepts we
defined in Chapter 1 apply here without any modification, such as Walrasian equilibrium,
core and bargaining set. We will not repeat those definitions.
5.3 Bargaining set and Walrasian equilibrium
In this section we introduce bargaining set, Walrasian equilibrium and related concepts
for the private information economy model.
A price or price process is a measurable mapping from T to ∆m. For each t ∈ T ,
p(t) is the commodity prices when the signal profile t is picked by Mother Nature.
An allocation x is a measurable mapping from I × T to Rm+ . For each t ∈ T , agent
i’s commodity bundle is x(i, t). It is conventional to assume that x(·, t) is integrable for
P T -almost all t ∈ T .














Let L1(T,Rm+ ) be the vector space of all integrable mappings from the measure space
(T, T , P T ) to Rm+ . When the price process is p, an agent i is faced with an interim
budget set Bi(p) defined as:
Bi(p) =
{









The following two definitions are standard and self-explanatory.
Definition 5.3.1. (Feasibility) Let E = {(I × Ω, I  F , λ P ), u, e, (t˜i, i ∈ I), s˜} be a
private information economy and A be a coalition. An allocation x for E is A-feasible if∫
A x(i, t)dλ =
∫
A e(i)dλ for P
T -almost all t ∈ T . In particular, x is said to be feasible
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when A = I.
Definition 5.3.2. (Efficiency) Let E = {(I × Ω, I  F , λ P ), u, e, (t˜i, i ∈ I), s˜} be a
private information economy. An allocation x for E is efficient if there is no feasible
allocation y such that Ui(yi) > Ui(xi) for λ-almost all i ∈ I.
Now we give the definition of Walrasian equilibrium. It shall be noted that Walrasian
equilibrium is termed ex ante Walrasian equilibrium in [52]. However, we omit the explicit
prefix ”ex ante” since all concepts in this chapter are defined in the ”ex ante” sense.
Definition 5.3.3. (Walrasian Equilibrium) Let E = {(I × Ω, I  F , λ P ), u, e, (t˜i, i ∈ I), s˜}
be a private information economy. A Walrasian equilibrium is a pair of an allocation x∗
and a price p∗ such that





I e(i)dλ for P -almost all t ∈ T .
2. For λ-almost all i ∈ I, x∗i is a maximizer of the following problem:
max Ui(z)
s.t. z ∈ Bi(p∗)
Condition (1) is standard, i.e., the market clears in the equilibrium.
Condition (2) indicates that each agent maximizes her expected utility subject to her
interim budget set.
Definition 5.3.4. (Walrasian Allocation) Let E = {(I × Ω, I  F , λ P ), u, e, (t˜i, i ∈ I), s˜}
be a private information economy. An allocation x is called a Walrasian allocation if there
is a price p such that (x, p) forms a Walrasian equilibrium. The set of all Walrasian al-
locations is denoted by WE(E).
In Chapter 1 we introduced bargaining set as a refinement to the notion of core. In
the following, we will introduce this concept to the private information economy. All
related concepts such as objection and counterobjection are similar.
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Definition 5.3.5. (Objection) Let E = {(I × Ω, I  F , λ P ), u, e, (t˜i, i ∈ I), s˜} be a
private information economy. Suppose x is an allocation, (W, y) is a pair of a coalition
and an allocation. (W, y) is an objection to the allocation x if
1. y is W -feasible, i.e.,
∫
W y(i, t)dλ =
∫
W e(i)dλ for P
T -almost all t ∈ T .
2. • Ui(yi) ≥ Ui(xi) for λ-almost all i ∈W and
• λ ({i ∈W : Ui(yi) > Ui(xi)}) > 0.
Remark 5.3.6. 1. When the utility function ui of agent i is continuous and strictly
monotone, Condition (2) is equivalent to
(2’) Ui(yi) > Ui(xi) for λ-almost all i ∈W .
2. y is said to block x on W in the context of core.
Definition 5.3.7. (Counterobjection) Let E = {(I × Ω, I  F , λ P ), u, e, (t˜i, i ∈ I), s˜}
be a private information economy. Suppose x is an allocation, (W, y) is an objection to
the allocation x. The pair (V, z) of a coalition and an allocation is a counterobjection to
(W, y) if
1. z is V -feasible, i.e.,
∫
V z(i, t)dλ =
∫
V e(i)dλ for P
T -almost all t ∈ T .
2. • Ui(zi) > Ui(yi) for λ-almost all i ∈ V ∩W ,
• Ui(zi) > Ui(xi) for λ-almost all i ∈ V \W .
Remark 5.3.8. 1. In Mas-Colell’s definition of counterobjection (see Definition 2,
[40]), T is required to be of positive measure (see Condition (b)). Although no such
condition is stated explicitly in our definition, T is also assumed to be of positive
measure in our definition. Remember that T is a coalition which is assumed to
have a positive measure (see Definition 1.1.7, Chapter 1). Hence, our definition is
consistent with Mas-Colell’s in this aspect.
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2. Some authors require λ(V ∩W ) > 0 in Condition (2). For example, see p. 292 -
293, [38].
Definition 5.3.9. An objection is said to be justified if there is no counterobjection to
it.
Definition 5.3.10. (Bargaining Set) Let E = {(I × Ω, I  F , λ P ), u, e, (t˜i, i ∈ I), s˜}
be a private information economy.
1. A allocation is called a Bargaining allocation if it is feasible, efficient and has no
justified objection.
2. The bargaining set of E is the set of all bargaining allocations. It is denoted by
B(E).
The definition of core and core allocation is standard. It is given below:
Definition 5.3.11. (Core and Core allocation) Let E = {(I × Ω, I  F , λ P ), u, e, (t˜i, i ∈ I), s˜}
be a private information economy.
1. A feasible allocation x is called a core allocation if there is no allocation that blocks
x.
2. The core of E is the set of all core allocations. It is denoted by C(E).
5.4 Assumptions and results
5.4.1 Assumptions
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A3 For any fixed i ∈ I, s ∈ S, the utility function u(i, ·, s) is continuous and strictly
monotone.
A4 For any fixed i ∈ I, s ∈ S, the utility function u(i, ·, s) is concave.
A5 The signal process f is essentially pairwise independent conditioned on the macro
state of nature s˜. That is, for λ-almost all i ∈ I, the following property holds: t˜i
and t˜j are independent conditioned on s˜ for λ-almost j ∈ I.
A6 The signal process f is non-trivial in the sense that for any s, s′ ∈ S, s 6= s′,µs 6= µs′ ,
where µs and µs′ are the average signal distribution conditioned on the macro state
of nature s and s′. 1
5.4.2 Results
Before we state our main theorem, we shall present some important results from [52]
which will be used in our proof of the main theorem.
Lemma 5.4.1. Let Ls = {t ∈ T : λf−1t = µs} for each s ∈ S and L0 = T \ ∪s∈SLs.
Then
1. {L0} ∪ {Ls : s ∈ S} forms a measurable partition of T .
2. P T (∪s∈SLs) = 1.
Proof Since assumption A6 holds, Ls, s ∈ S, are disjoint.





it follows from the Fubini Theorem that gq is T -measurable.
1For details, see Section 1.2.2 of Chapter 1.
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Note that
Ls = ∩q∈T 0{t ∈ T : λf−1t (q) = µs(q)}
= ∩q∈T 0{t ∈ T : gq(t) = µs(q)},
Ls is measurable.
Hence, {L0} ∪ {Ls : s ∈ S} is a measurable partition of T . This proves part (1).
For part (2), when assumption A5 holds, the exact law of large numbers indicates
that λf−1t = µs for P Ts -almost all t ∈ T . Hence P Ts (Ls) = 1 for each s ∈ S. It follows




s (∪s∈SLs) = 1. This completes the proof.
Q.E.D.
The following two mappings and their extensions defined in [52] establish the rela-
tionship between a private information economy E and its state contingent economy Epi.
They are very useful in the study of these two economies.




I e(i)dλ if t ∈ L0
api(s) if t ∈ Ls for some s ∈ S,
where api ∈ (Rm+ )S .
It is clear that when assumption A6 holds, Φ is well-defined.
Suppose api ∈ (Rm+ )S is an agent’s consumption in the state contingent economy Epi,
Φ(api) can be considered as her consumption in the private information economy E . Let
xpi be an allocation for Epi, we can define an allocation xp for E in a natural way by
letting xp(i, t) = Φ(xpii )(t) for each i ∈ I. This mapping has many desirable properties as
we shall see later. Ideally, we should assign a symbol other than Φ for the new mapping
of allocations between the two economies. However, we will continue to use Φ for the
new mapping for the sake of notational minimality. No confusion shall arise.
The second mapping Ψ can be considered as the reverse of Φ. It maps allocations
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from a private information economy to the corresponding state contingent economy. Its




z(t)dP Ts , for each s ∈ S,
where z ∈ L1(T,Rm+ ). Ψ(z) is a mapping from L1(T,Rm+ ) to (Rm+ )S .
For an allocation xp in E , we can define an allocation xpi in Epi as xpi(i, s) = Ψ(xpi )(s)
for i ∈ I and s ∈ S. In such way, Ψ maps an allocation from the private information
economy E to the state contingent economy Epi. As with the mapping Φ, we use the
same notation for these two mappings.
The mappings Φ and Ψ possess desirable properties as shown in [52]. We cite those
results in the following lemmas without proof. The following three lemmas correspond
to Lemma 2, Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, and Corollary 1 in [52].
Lemma 5.4.2. Let xpi be an allocation for the state contingent economy Epi. Define
xp = Φ(xpi). We have







pi(i)dλ for a coalition A ∈ I, then ∫A xp(i, t)dλ = ∫A e(i)dλ for
P -almost all t ∈ T . In particular, if xpi is feasible, then xp is also feasible.
Statement (1) indicates that the mapping Φ retains the utility of each agent between
two economies.
Statement (2) shows that if an allocation xpi for the economy Epi is A-feasible, then
the corresponding allocation xp is also A-feasible. In particular, the feasibility of xpi
implies that of xp.
Lemma 5.4.3. Let xp be an allocation for the private information economy E. Define
xpi = Ψ(xp). We have
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for a coalition A ∈ I. In particular, if xp is feasible, then xpi is also feasible.
In contrast to Φ, Ψ does not retain utility. In fact, it increases the utility of an agent
as statement (1) indicates.
Statement (2) shows that if an allocation xp in E is A-feasible, then the corresponding
allocation xpi is also A-feasible. If A is taken to be the grand coalition I, then the
statement (2) says that the feasibility of xp implies that of xpi.
The following lemma gives a sufficient condition under which the mapping Ψ retains
utility.
Lemma 5.4.4. Let xp be an allocation for the private information economy E. Define
xpi = Ψ(xp). If xp is efficient, then Ui(x
p




i ) for i ∈ I.
If we start with an efficient allocation xp for the private information economy E ,
we can obtain an allocation xpi = Ψ(xp). By the above lemma, we know that agents
have the same utility with these two allocation schemes. For the allocation xpi, we can
construct an allocation yp for the economy E as yp = Φ(xpi). Lemma 5.4.2 and 5.4.4 tell







p(i, t)dλ for P -almost all t ∈ T . Hence, xp and yp are identical to
agents in some sense.
The following lemma (corresponds to Lemma 7 in [52]) shows that the mapping Φ
carries a core allocation for the state contingent economy Epi to a core allocation for the
private information economy E . As a matter of fact, the mapping Ψ also possesses this
property. That is, it maps a core allocation for E to a core allocation for Epi. This is the
content of Lemma 6 in [52]. Since we do not use that result, we will not include it here.
Lemma 5.4.5. If xpi is a core allocation for the state contingent economy Epi, then
xp = Φ(xpi) is a core allocation for the private information economy E.
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As for deterministic economies, the famous core equivalence theorem can also be
proven for the private information economy as shown in the Proposition 2 of [52]. We
state it below.
Lemma 5.4.6. An allocation xpi for the private information economy E is a core allo-
cation if and only if it is a Walrasian equilibrium allocation.
The purpose of this chapter is to show the equivalence between the concept of bar-
gaining set and Walrasian equilibrium in the private information economy. As a common
approach in the study of private information economy, we often resort to results for the
corresponding state contingent economy. Hence, it is important to investigate the prop-
erties of various concepts in these two economies. The following two lemmas establish
the relationship between bargaining sets in a private information economy and its state
contingent economy.
Lemma 5.4.7. Let xp be a bargaining allocation for the private information economy E.
Define xpi = Ψ(xp). Then xpi is a bargaining allocation for the state contingent economy
Epi.
Proof Let (W, ypi) be an objection to xpi, we shall show that such an objection is unjus-
tified. To this end, we need to find a counterobjection to (W, ypi).
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i ) for λ-almost all i ∈W .
Since xp is assumed to be efficient according to the definition, by Lemma 5.4.4,
Ui(x
p




i ). Hence, it follows from the above inequality that Ui(x
p
i ) < Ui(y
p
i ) for
λ-almost all i ∈ W . Together with the first equality above, we know that (W, yp) is an
objection to xp.
Since xp is a bargaining allocation, there must exist a counterobjection to (W, yp).






V e(i)dλ for P -almost all t ∈ T .
2. Ui(z
p
i ) > Ui(y
p
i ) for λ-almost all i ∈ V ∩W and Ui(zpi ) > Ui(xpi ) for λ-almost all
i ∈ V \W .
Let zpi = Ψ(zp), we want to show that (V, zpi) is a counterobjection to (W, ypi). By
Lemma 5.4.3, upii (z
pi






pi(i)dλ. Hence, zpi is V -feasible.
Also note that
1. for i ∈ V ∩W , upii (zpii ) ≥ Ui(zpi ) > Ui(ypi ) = upii (ypii ),
2. for i ∈ V \W , upii (zpii ) ≥ Ui(zpi ) > Ui(xpi ) = upii (xpii ),
hence (V, zpi) is a counterobjection to (W, ypi). This indicates that there is no justified
objection to xpi. Hence xpi is a bargaining allocation. Q.E.D.
Now, we are ready to state the main theorem of this chapter.
Theorem 5.4.8. Bargaining set and Walrasian equilibrium coincide in a private infor-
mation economy E in the sense that WE(E) = B(E).
Proof The proof that a Walrasian equilibrium is a bargaining allocation is standard.
So we omit it. We prove the converse, i.e., a bargaining allocation is also a Walrasian
equilibrium.
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The proof is simple and we only need to weave together all the above mentioned
lemmas. We sketch the outline. Let xp be a bargaining set for E . Define xpi = Ψ(xp).
By Lemma 5.4.7, xpi is a bargaining set for Epi. By Mas-Colell’s equivalence theorem for
bargaining set (see Theorem 1.1.16, Chapter 1), xpi is a Walrasian equilibrium allocation,
which in turn is a core allocation by the standard Core Equivalence Theorem. By Lemma
5.4.5 and 5.4.6, xp is a Walrasian equilibrium allocation for E . This completes the proof.
Q.E.D.
Combining with Lemma 5.4.6, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 5.4.9. Bargaining set, core and Walrasian equilibrium coincide in a private
information economy E in the sense that WE(E) = B(E) = C(E).
5.5 Discussion
This chapter examines Mas-Colell’s type of bargaining set in a private information econ-
omy model. It establishes the classical equivalence theorem between bargaining set and
Walrasian equilibrium for the private information economy model under the conditions
of conditionally pairwise independent signals and non-trivial signal process. This result,
coupled with Sun and Yannelis’ equivalence theorem for core and Walrasian equilibrium
in [52], indicates that Walrasian equilibrium, core and bargaining set all coincide in a
private information economy under the above-mentioned conditions.
Although we follow Mas-Colell’s definition of bargaining set, it shall be noted that
our definition deviates slightly from the original one. As Mas-Colell mentioned (without
a proof) in [40], an allocation in the bargaining set is efficient in a large deterministic
economy. We conjecture that this statement continues to hold in a private information
economy model. However, we could not find a proof for it for the time being. Sun
and Yannelis [52] show that when an allocation for the private information economy
is efficient, the mapping Ψ retains the utility of each agent in the corresponding state
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contingent economy. Hence, in order to use this property, we need to impose the efficiency
condition explicitly in the definition. In the literature, it is found that Serrano and Vohra
[48] also require a bargaining set allocation to be efficient. Our definition is in accordance
with theirs.
Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz [20] also provide an equivalence theorem between bar-
gaining set and Walrasian equilibrium. The main difference is that in their definition,
an allocation is related to private information (measurable with respect to a σ-algebra
of private information). Hence, the bargaining set should be regarded as a refinement
to the notion of private core (see [58]). For this reason, they call it private bargaining
set in the paper. On the contrary, we define the bargaining set in an ex ante sense. In
our model, an allocation is a function of the aggregate private information signals, i.e.,
signal profile. Nevertheless, both definitions are based on the same idea that a threat by




Basic Notations and Definitions
A.0.1 Notations
1. R+: the set of all nonnegative real numbers, R+ = {x ∈ R : x ≥ 0}.
2. Rn: n-dimensional Euclidean space.
3. Rn+: the positive cone of Rn, Rn+ = {(x1, . . . , xn) : xi ≥ 0}.
4. xy: inner product of two vectors x and y in Rn. If x = (x1, . . . , xn) and y =
(y1, . . . , yn), then xy =
∑n
i=1 xiyi.
5. x ≥ y (or x ≤ y): x, y ∈ Rn, xi ≥ yi (or xi ≤ yi), i = 1, . . . , n, where xi and yi are
the i-th component of x and y respectively.
6. x > y (or x < y): x, y ∈ Rn, xi ≥ yi (or xi ≤ yi), i = 1, . . . , n, but x 6= y, where xi
and yi are the i-th component of x and y respectively.
7. x >> y (or x << y): x, y ∈ Rn, xi > yi (or xi < yi), i = 1, . . . , n, where xi and yi
are the i-th component of x and y respectively.
8. BRn+ : the Borel σ-algebra on Rn+.
9. ∆n: the unit simplex in Rn+, ∆n = {(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn+ :
∑n
j=1 xj = 1}.
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A.0.2 Definitions
Definition A.0.1. A measure space (I, I, λ) is atomless (or nonatomic) if for each
A ∈ I, λ(A) > 0, there exists a subset B of A such that 0 < λ(B) < λ(A). In particular,
a singleton is of measure zero in an atomless space. For more details, see p. 31 of [12].
Definition A.0.2. Let A be a subset of X, the indicator function 1A on X is defined as
1A(x) =
 1 if x ∈ A0 otherwise.
Definition A.0.3. Let u be a real-valued mapping on a subset D of Rn.
1. u is continuous on D if limu(xn) = u(x) for any x ∈ D and any sequence {xn}
in D that converges to x, i.e., limxn = x.
2. u is monotone if u(x) > u(y) for all x, y ∈ D,x >> y.
3. u is strictly monotone if u(x) > u(y) for all x, y ∈ D,x > y.
4. u is convex (or concave) if D is convex, and u(tx+(1−t)y) ≤ tu(x)+(1−t)u(y)
(or ≥) for all x, y ∈ D,x 6= y, 0 < t < 1.
5. u is strictly convex (or concave) if D is convex, and u(tx+ (1− t)y) < tu(x) +
(1− t)u(y) (or >) for all x, y ∈ D,x 6= y, 0 < t < 1.
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